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Abstract 
This artrcle describes three diagnostic methods for use with industrial processes. They are 
measurement validation, i.e., consistency checking of sensor and measurement values using any 
redundancy of instrumentation; alarm analysis, i.e., analysis of multiple alarm situations to find 
which alarms ate directly connected to primary faults and which alarms are consequential effects 
of the primary ones; andfault diagnosis, i.e., a search for the causes of and remedies for faults. The 
three methods use multilevel Jaw models (MFM), to describe the target process. They have been 
implemented in the real-time expert system tool G2, in C, and in Common Lisp, and successfully 
tested on simulations of several processes. 
The knowledge representation tology used is based on the notion of$ows, of mass, energy, and 
information, which are used to describe physical systems. The relationships between structure and 
function of a system is described by teleological relations, which connect he flow structures into 
a graph, built at model construction time. This allows the diagnostic reasoning to be implemented 
as searchers in a static graph structure, and it can thus be performed extremely rapidly. As with 
other model-based approaches, general algorithms are used over a representation with generative 
capacities. The representation gains strength from being functional with a very abstract physical 
level, more abstract han most qualitative physics models. It works well with systems that can 
be described using flows, while it currently lacks the capability of capturing important aspects of 
other types of systems, for example, electronic circuits. 
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1. Introduction 
Diagnosis of industrial processes can be performed with different types of models. 
However, most model types in use today focus on physical structure and behavior, and 
contain little or no means-end, i.e., teleological, information. The latter is important for 
diagnosis, though, and it seems to be worthwhile to try and incorporate more teleological 
knowledge in model-based diagnosis. 
This article describes diagnosis using one type of explicit means-end models, mul- 
tilevel jaw models (MFM), as developed by Lind [ 731. These are functional models 
with a very high level of abstraction, combined with a teleological representation of 
goals, or purposes, of the modeled system. Lind has suggested a syntax for a formal 
language and given general ideas on how to use the MFM representation. Note that 
there are several minor differences between different versions of MFM, as presented in 
[ 731, in Lind’s newer version [ 79,801, and in [ 671. The following work is based on 
the version described in [ 671, while the latest definition of MFM appears in [ 79,801. 
The contributions of this article are descriptions of three methods for diagnostic 
reasoning using MFM: 
l measurement validation, 
0 alarm analysis, 
l fault diagnosis. 
The measurement validation algorithm takes a set of measured flow values and uses 
any available redundancy to check consistency. A single erroneous flow measurement is 
marked and corrected. If there are several conflicting values, the consistent subgroups 
of measurements are marked but no flow value is corrected. 
The alarm analysis algorithm takes as input a set of alarm states such as normal, low 
flow, highJlow, low volume, and high volume. Each alarm is associated with a part of 
an MFM model, and the method recognizes the primary alarms, while the other alarms 
are either primary or consequences of the primary ones. 
The fault diagnosis algorithm uses an MFM model to produce a “backward chain- 
ing” style of diagnosis. The input can come from questions answered by the user or 
from measured signals and triggering of rules. The system looks for faults, provides 
explanations, and gives remedies. 
2. The basic concepts of MFM 
An MFM model is a normative description of a system, a representation of what it 
has been designed to do, how it should do it, and with what it should do it. Thus, the 
three basic concept types of MFM are: 
0 goals, 
l functions, 
l physical components. 
The goals are the objectives or purposes of the system, i.e., the ends that the con- 
structors and operators want the system to reach. The functions are the means by which 
the goals are obtained, i.e., the powers or capabilities of the system. The physical com- 
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Fig. 1. Goals, functions, components, and relations. The functions are connected to goals via achieve relations, 
while the components are connected to functions via realize relations. Subgoals may be connected to functions 
via condition relations, but this is not shown in the figure. All three kinds of relations are many-to-many. 
ponents are what the system is constructed from, the equipment of which it consists. 
The go,&, functions, and components depend on each other in specific ways. Thus, 
in MFM there are different types of relations, that can be used to connect the objects: 
l achieve relations, 
l condition relations, 
0 realize relations. 
An achieve relation connects a set of functions to a goal, and it signifies that these 
functions are used to obtain that goal. For example, the function of transporting water 
into a tank could be used to achieve the goal of keeping the level of the tank high 
enough. 
A condition relation connects a goal to a function, and signifies that the goal must 
be fulfilled in order for the function to be available. For example, this would be the 
case for a mass transport function realized as a pump, where the subgoal of delivering 
electrical power to the pump must be fulfilled in order for the pump to drive the mass 
flow. 
A reaZi:~e relation connects a physical component to a function, and signifies that the 
component is used to realize or implement the function. For example, a pump could be 
used to realize a mass transport function. 
It is important to observe that all the relations can be many-to-many. Several functions 
can be usNed to achieve one goal, one function may satisfy several goals, one goal can 
be a condition to several functions, one function may be conditioned by several goals, 
one function can be realized with many different components, and one component can 
implement several different functions, see Fig. 1. 
MFM dlemands that goals, functions, and physical components be viewed as separate 
entities. The assumption that functions are separate from components is similar to the 
no function in structure assumption of qualitative physics. In addition to this, MFM also 
assumes that the goals are not given by separate functions. Instead they must be stated 
by the designer during model construction. 
3. Goals 
The concept of a goal is central to MFM, as it is the representational device for 
teleologic,al information. It is important to be able to recognize and describe goals, as 
they play an important part in every activity using means-end information. Without 
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knowing the goals, it is more or less impossible to know the available functions. A 
broad definition of a goal is as follows: 
A goal is the outcome towards which certain activities of a system are directed. 
However, this definition is very general, and it is useful to narrow it down to more 
specific descriptions. Thus, three different types of goals are recognized: 
l production goals, 
0 safety goals, 
l economy goals. 
Production goals 
A production goal is used to express that to enable production, some specific process 
variable should be kept within a specified interval, i.e., that an inequality of the following 
general form should be satisfied: 
Of course, one of the limits could be infinitely small or large. This means that the 
system will be kept in a certain state, where production is indeed possible. 
Safety goals 
A safety goal is used to express that for reasons of safe operation, some specific 
process variable should be kept above or below some value, or inside or outside an 
interval, i.e., essentially the same test as for a production goal. However, a more common 
case is probably a one-sided interval. In practise, this means that some process variables 
should be kept within safe regions, far enough from dangerous values. 
Economy goals 
An economy goal is used to express considerations of overall process optimization. 
Thus, it is typically connected to a rather complex function G( xt , x2, x3, . . .) , depending 
on operational constraints and economical efficiency. The satisfaction could be expressed 
as satisfaction of the following inequality: 
Go < G(Xl,X2,X3,...) < Gl, 
where GO and Gt are numerical limits inside which the system is working with satisfac- 
tory efficiency. It would also be possible to define an economy goal as an optimization, 
i.e., an inequality of the following form: 
Often, however, it is impossible to use this form directly. Instead, the test must be 
translated into one of the earlier forms in order to be useful. 
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4. Functions 
The second important concept of MFM is that of afunction. In the context of processes 
it is possible to find several interpretations of the function concept. In MFM a function 
is always associated with a goal, and correspondingly, goals are always associated with 
functions. 
In general, a function of a system could be given the following definition: 
A function is a r6le that a system has in the achievement of a goal. 
MFM describes the functional structure of a system as a set of interrelated flow struc- 
tures on different abstraction levels. The levels are connected via achieve and condition 
relations, and the how structures consist of connected flow functions. The types of tlow 
structures currently treated in MFM are: 
0 mass flows, 
0 energ:y flows, 
0 information flows. 
These flows are of completely different ypes, but they have many properties in common. 
Most flow functions can appear in each type of flow structure, thus, there are three $0~ 
types of flow functions. 
There are also several function types, which are treated in MFM. First, there are the 







These functions can be used for describing information flows as well. There are also 
some specific information flow functions: 
l observer, 
l decision maker, 
0 actor. 
In addition to the flow functions proper, some organizational functions are also used. 
They are concerned with expressing support and control: 
0 network, 
0 manager. 
The network function is used to group a flow structure and connect it to a goal, while the 
manager function describes control and supervisory systems, including human operators. 
Most of the graphical symbols used to build MFM models are shown in Fig. 2. 
The choice of jaw functions 
The flow functions chosen in MFM are specifically aimed at describing certain aspects 
of physical systems, primarily mass and energy flows. This choice is a limitation, but it 
is not arbitrary. The motives for choosing jlow functions are as follows: 
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Mass flow functions 
Energy flow functions 
Source Transport Barrier 
~~~ .::i:i: :; F>kzy ,, 
Storage Balance Sink 
Observer Decision Actor Manager Network Goal 
Fig. 2. The symbols for the different MFh4 objects. 
l Interchange of mass and energy is responsible for the causal interaction between 
physical components. 
l Controlling the flows of mass and energy is important for safety. 
l Controlling the flows of mass and energy is important for production efficiency. 
l How concepts applies to a wide range of physical processes. 
Thus, while the choice of flow functions is a limitation, it is general and useful enough 
to be interesting. MFM could be extented with other types of functions, see [67] for a 
discussion. 
Source functions 
A source function represents the capability of a physical system to act as an infinite 
reservoir of mass, energy, or information. Of course, this is an idealization of the behavior 
of a physical system, but it is often useful. Typical examples of source functions are 
provided by tanks, storages, power supplies, information transmitters, etc. A source 
function is characterized by an output flow F, and it can have capability limitations 
which maximize F. It has one output port where it can be connected to other flow 
functions, and it can also be connected to subgoals via condition relations. 
Transport functions 
A transport function represents the capability of a system to transfer mass, energy, 
or information from one part of the system to another or from one medium to another. 
Typical examples of transport functions are provided by pumps, pipes where liquids are 
transported by gravity, heat exchangers, information channels, etc. A transport function 
is characterized by a throughput flow F, and it can have capability limitations, e.g., 
an interval in which F must lie. It has one input and one output port where it can be 
connected to other flow functions, and it can be connected to subgoals via condition 
relations. 
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Barrier functions 
A barrier function represents the capability of a system to prevent the transfer of mass, 
energy or information from one part of the system to another or from one medium to 
another. Typical examples of barrier functions are provided by traps in water systems, 
heat isolating materials, the safety encasing of nuclear reactors, encryption devices, etc. 
A barrier function is characterized by a throughput flow F, which should be close or 
equal to zero. It has one input and one output port where it can be connected to other 
flow funct.ions, and it can be connected to subgoals via condition relations. 
Storage fhmctions 
A storage function represents the capability of a system to accumulate mass, energy, 
or information. Typical examples of storage functions are provided by tanks where 
liquids are stored, the water in a central heating system where energy is stored, memory 
where information is stored, etc. A storage function is characterized by a state variable 
V, representing the amount of mass or energy accumulated, and 
one output flow Fo. These attributes should fulfill the inequality: 
one input flow Fi and 
dV 
- -fi+F, GE,, 
dt 
if it can be defined. A storage function has one input and one output port where it can 
be connected to other flow functions, and it can be connected to subgoals via condition 
relations. In the original formulation of Lind, a storage function may have several inputs 
and outputs, [73]. For simplicity, this has been disallowed in the current work. 
Balance functions 
A balance function represents the capability of a system to provide a balance between 
the total rates of incoming and outgoing flows. Typical examples of balance functions 
are provided by forks in pipes, injection of steam in heated water, channel selectors, 
etc. A bal,ance function is characterized by a set of input and output flows. These flows 
should fulfill the inequality: 
]FI +Fz+...+F,,I <cl. 
A balance function has several input and output ports where it can be connected to other 
flow functions, and it can be connected to subgoals via condition relations. 
Sink functions 
A sink function represents the capability of a system to act as an infinite drain of 
mass, energy or information. As with sources, this is an idealization of the behavior of a 
physical s:ystem, but it is often useful. Typical examples of sink functions are provided 
by tanks, storages, energy dissipation, information receivers, etc. A sink function is 
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characterized by an input flow F, and it can have capability limits which maximize F. 
It has one input port where it can be connected to other flow functions, and it can also 
be connected to subgoals via condition relations. 
Observer functions 
An observer function represents the capability of a system to translate physical obser- 
vations to information. Typical examples of observer functions are provided by measure- 
ment devices, but they can also be performed by human operators. An observer function 
has one output port where it can be connected to other flow functions, and it can also 
be connected to subgoals via condition relations. 
Decision functions 
A decision function represents the decision making capabilities of a system. Decision 
functions are performed by both control systems and operators. In this work, even 
low-level control algorithms are modeled with decision functions, which differs from 
the intentions of Lind [ 731. Lind does not view simple control algorithms as decision 
making. A decision function has one input and one output port where it can be connected 
to other flow functions, and it can also be connected to subgoals via condition relations. 
Actor functions 
An actor function represents the capability of a system to turn information into 
physical consequences. Typical examples of actor functions are provided by valves and 
motors, but they can also be performed by operators. An actor function has one input 
port where it can be connected to other flow functions, and it can also be connected to 
subgoals via condition relations. 
Network functions 
A network function represents the property of a system to provide the conditions 
necessary to allow another system to perform its function. It is used as a way of 
grouping several connected flow functions into a flow structure. A network function can 
be connected to goals via achieve relations. 
Manager functions 
A manager function is used to represent resource management and control. A typical 
example would be the description of a control system, not as an information flow, but 
as a system intended to manage a certain task. In the current work, manager functions 
may be connected to an information flow path. A manager function has one port where 
it can be connected to an achieve-by-control relation. It can contain a network of flow 
functions describing an information flow. 
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All the tlow functions have several attributes associated to them, but as these depend 
on the algorithms that use them, they will be described together with the reasoning 
methods, in later sections. 
This concludes the description of the semantics of MFM. It would certainly be possible 
to use a representation based on, for example, predicate logic, but no such representation 
has been developed. For the simple and fast diagnostic algorithms to be presented in 
this article, the graphical representation with a simple, underlying data structure based 
on objects and links is quite sufficient. 
5. Flow structures 
Flow functions may be connected to each other into flow paths or Jrow structures. 
These structures are used to model how mass, energy, or information flows from function 
to function. In fact, flow functions always belong to a flow path and may never be used 
in isolation. 
A flow structure is a graph of connected flow functions. The functions can be con- 
nected via three different types of relations, called links in the terminology of Lind: 
0 mass !Aow connections, 
a energy flow connections, 
a information flow connections. 
The fiow fkction connection syntax 
Flow functions may only be connected according to specific syntax rules: 
l A flow function can only be connected at its specific connection points. 
l A flow function may only be connected to functions of the same flow type, i.e., 
mass, energy, or information. 
l Sources may only be connected to outgoing transports. 
l Transports may be connected to sources, storages, balances, sinks, observers, de- 
cision functions, and actors. They must be outgoing from sources and observers, 
and incoming to sinks and actors, but may have any direction when connected to 
storages, balances, and decision functions. 
l Barriers may only be connected to balances. 
l Storages may only be connected to transports. 
l Balances may only be connected to transports and barriers. 
l Sinks may only be connected to incoming transports. 
l Observers may only be connected to outgoing transports. 
l Decision functions may only be connected to transports. 
l Actors’ may only be connected to incoming transports. 
The original formulation of Lind allows storages and barriers to be connected, and stor- 
ages may have multiple inports and outports, but for simplicity this has been disallowed 
here. A storage with multiple connections can always be replaced by a storage connected 
via transports to one or two balances with many ports. 
The rationale for these connection rules may be formulated in the following points: 
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Fig. 3. A heat exchanger system. The flowsheet shows how water is pumped through a steam injector, where 
it is heated with steam, and through a plate heat exchanger, where it heats the product. 
l Some rules are needed in order to ensure intelligible models, e.g., the demand that 
only flow functions of the same flow type be connected. 
l Some rules are motivated by consistency, e.g., that sources may not be connected 
to incoming transports, or that transports may not be directly connected to each 
other. 
l Some rules derive from the assumption that transports are active and other functions 
passive, i.e., the transports drive the flows. Thus sources, storages, balances, and 
sinks must be connected to transports, to produce flows. This is also the reason for 
why transports may not be connected directly to barriers. 
The given description of MFM is based on [ 731, while the following is original work. It 
should be noted that later versions of MFM differ in the descriptions of control systems 
and information flow, [ 79,801. 
6. An example of a flow model 
The following example will be used to explain the basic concepts of MFM. The target 
process consists of a plate heat exchanger, see Fig. 3. This simple system serves quite 
well to explain the concepts of MFM. The primary goal is to heat the product to a 
certain temperature, but a brief analysis shows that there are two subgoals also: having 
water and product available, i.e., bringing the media to the heat exchanger: 
l Gl: heat product to certain temperature, 
l G2: bring product to heat exchanger, 
l G3: bring water to heat exchanger. 
The given example process is rather small, but there are many functions present: 
l Fl: provide product, 
l F2: transport product, 
l F3: transfer thermal energy between media, 
l F4: provide thermal energy, 
l F5: transport thermal energy, 
0 F6: transport water, 
l F7: provide water, 
l F8: provide stream, 
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Fig. 4. Goals, functions, components, and relations of the heat exchanger system. 
l F9: tmnsport steam, 
l FlO: mix water and steam. 
The third type of objects are the physical components. Note that the product and water 
tanks do not actually appear in Fig. 3. 
l Cl: product tank, 
l C2: product pump, 
l C3: heat exchanger, 
l C4: water tank, 
0 C5: water pump, 
l C6: steam system, 
0 C7: steam valve, 
l C8: steam injector. 
These are the sets of goals, functions, and components. However, the relations between 
these objects are important. First, the goal Gl is superior to G2 and G3, i.e., the latter 
are subgoals of Gl. Thus, there is a goal hierarchy, formed by goal-subgoal relations. 
There are also relations between goals, functions, and components. For example, the 
heat exchanger component is used to realize the function of transferring thermal energy 
from water to product, and this function is used to achieve the goal of heating the 
product. In Fig. 4, both the goal hierarchy and the means-end relations are shown in a 
graph. As can be seen, the graph of objects and relations is quite complex, even for a 
small process as the one in the example. In an MFM model, the goals, functions, and 
relations are represented in a graphical language. A model of the example process is 
found in Fig. 5. 
7. Diagnostic algorithms 
Before we proceed to describe the diagnostic methods, it will be useful to mention a 
few facts about the implementations performed. 
The algorithms have been implemented in the real-time expert system tool G2, 
[ 89,901, as a part of the doctor’s project described in [ 671. All three algorithms were 
successfully tested on simulations of two processes, a simple lab process and Steritherm. 
The latter is a real-world process for ultra-high temperature sterilization of liquid food 
products. 
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Fig. 5. A flow model of the heat exchanger system. The goals and goal hierarchy are shown in the tree 
structure of the graph, while the functions are connected into flow paths in three networks. The topmost goal, 
to heat the product, is achieved by the beat transfer flow path (upper network), while the subgoals, to bring 
water and product o the heat exchanger, are achieved by the water flow path (lower left), and the product 
flow path (lower right). The components and realize relations are not shown. 
The algorithms have also been implemented in C, and together with a graphical editor 
and an ASCII file system they form an MFM Toolbox for Macintosh systems. This 
version has been tested with several processes, including all used with the G2 and 
Common Lisp implementations. A simpler console version of this program will run on 
any system with a C compiler [ 691. 
The alarm analysis and fault diagnosis algorithms have also been implemented in 
Common Lisp for use in the Guardian system [40]. Here, the algorithms have been 
tested on several small examples of systems of the human body. Currently, a large MFM 
model of the body of an intensive-care unit patient is being verified by medical experts. 
8. The architecture of a monitoring and control system 
The three methods for diagnostic reasoning fit into different parts of a monitoring and 
control system. The measurement validation algorithm typically belongs on a rather low 
level, where it can be used to feed validated signal values to higher level algorithms, 
such as the alarm analysis, the fault diagnosis, and other tasks dealing with supervisory 
diagnosis and control, see Fig, 6. 
The inputs needed can be obtained in several different ways. They can be direct or 
filtered signals from sensors. It would also be possible, though, that they were the outputs 
of some low-level data filtration on the direct signals, e.g., outputs from a Kalman filter 
or from some statistical algorithm. 
The measured flow values are assigned to the attributes of the appropriate flow 
functions. It is these flow values that the measurement validation algorithm operates 
on. The validated output values could then be used by algorithms on higher levels. 





( Process 1 
Fig. 6. The places for the diagnostic methods in a monitoring and control system. Raw data from the process is 
treated by filters and low-level numerical routines before it is sent on to the other algorithms. The measurement 
validation algorithm works on an intermediate l vel, while the alarm analysis and fault diagnosis algorithms 
belong in the topmost, supervisory level of the system. 
The alarm analysis would be found in the higher levels of the system, together with 
supervisory control, user presentation, etc. The fault diagnosis method would also be 
placed here For example, in the Guardian system, the alarm analysis and fault diagnosis 
operate on qualitative data, supplied by several routines that perform data filtration and 
abstraction based on the current resources available to the system. 
The MEM algorithms can, of course, be used in a stand-alone fashion, presenting their 
results directly to the user or operator, but it is more realistic to use them as integral 
parts of a larger monitoring and control system. The latter approach was used in the 
project “Knowledge-Based Real-Time Control Systems” [3-9,631, and is currently being 
investigated in the Guardian project. Here, the MFM algorithms are used alternatively 
with other methods, depending on the available resources and needs, and the results of 
several methods may be combined to obtain higher quality diagnosis than any single 
method can provide. 
When the operating conditions of the target system change considerably, a new and 
different MFM model may be needed. This would, for example, be the case when a 
nuclear power plant switches from production to emergency shutdown mode. In such a 
case the monitoring and control system must also switch to a new MFM model. 
9. Measurement validation 
Most in~dustrial processes are equipped with a large number of sensors, of which 
several directly or indirectly measure the same variables. Especially when material and 
energy balance quations are taken into account, the total set of measurements commonly 
gives rise to redundancy, which can be used to check the consistency of the signals, i.e., 
to validate them. 
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Flow semantics 
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In order to use MFM as a basis for measurement validation, a semantics has been 
defined that assigns flow values and grouping information to the different flow functions. 
Four of the flow functions have their attributes in common, and have thus been grouped 
into one class, called jaw carrier. Sources, transports, non-forking balances, and sinks 
are all flow carriers. Storages, barrier functions, and forking balances are given a separate 
treatment. The following attributes are used: 
l Flow carriers have one flow value; a quantitative variable that corresponds to a 
physical flow of mass or energy. Its unit of measure could be, e.g., m3/s or J/s. A 
flow carrier is connected to a single measurement device, and its flow attribute is 
set to the value of the measured signal. 
l Storages have three flow values. There are input and output flows connected to cor- 
responding measurements. There is also a third attribute, corresponding to the rate 
of change of the mass or energy contained in the storage, i.e., the derivative of the 
storage’s volume. Thus, a storage can be connected to at most three measurements. 
l Barriers have no flow value, as they do not transport any matter or energy in 
working states, and they serve only as borders between separately analyzed flows. 
l Forking balances have no flow value. Instead, the sum of the inflows should equal 
the sum of the outflows. 
In addition to the flow attributes, each flow function contains information about whether 
it belongs to a group of several flow functions with consistent flow values, and also a 
validated, or reconciled, flow value, which can be different from the measured one. 
Consistent subgroups 
With use of the semantics above it is possible to split an MFM model (i.e., a set of 
connected flow functions) into internally consistent subgroups. This is done via use of 
the following rules: 
l For the flows, FI and F2, of two connected flow carriers the following inequality 
should hold: 
IF1 - F21 < ~1. 
If it does, the two flow carriers belong to the same (consistent) subgroup; they 
support each other. If, however, the flow values should disagree, they belong to sep- 
arate subgroups. This latter situation indicates that at least one of the measurements 
is in error. 
l If the input flow Fi of a storage is equal to the flow F of the flow carrier connected 
at the input of the storage, i.e., the following inequality holds: 
the input part of the storage belongs to the same subgroup as the flow carrier. 
Should the two flows disagree, the storage and the flow carrier belong to different 
subgroups. The corresponding is true for the output flow, F,, of a storage and the 
flow, F, of the flow carrier connected to it. 
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Fig. 7. An example of a flow path. Here the flow functions form t\yo consistent subgroups, where one group 
is surrounding the other. The three possible fault hypotheses are that the four measurements are correct and 
the one is faulty, that the one is correct and the four are faulty, and that all measurements are faulty. 





If it does, the input and output parts of a storage belong to the same subgroup, 
if not, they belong to separate subgroups. Note that this requires some separate 
measurement of the derivative. If this is not available, the flows connected to the 
inlet and the outlet must be treated as two completely separate flows. 
l For each balance, with inflows and outflows Fi, the following inequality should 
hold: 
IFI +F2+- ..+ F,I 6 ~1. 
If it does, the flow carriers connected to the balance all belong to the same consistent 
subgroup. If not, at least one of the connected flow carriers belong to another 
subgroup. In this case, the balance should be given a special marking, telling the 
user that one or more of the flow carriers are not consistent, while others may be. 
However, in the current implementations, all connected flow carriers are marked as 
belonging to different groups. 
l If the flow values of two flow functions agree, and the flow functions are in the 
same flow path, but separated by one or more inconsistent subgroups, they still 
belong to the same subgroup. However, flow functions that are not in the same 
flow path do not form subgroups. 
Applicatio:n of the five rules above enables a splitting of each flow into smaller groups 
with consistent measurement values. It should be noted that the last rule means that 
there can be groups with holes in them; they need not be directly consecutive. This is 
the case in Fig. 7. Here the flow values are shown above the flow functions and the 
subgroup information is shown with a shading of the graphical symbols. There are two 
subgroups, and one encloses the other. The last rule uses information about several flow 
functions connected in line; the other four only look at directly connected flow functions 
and no global analysis is needed. This enables the algorithm to be very efficient. 
Flow propagation 
The description so far has used the assumption that all flow functions have measure- 
ments. This is quite seldom the case. Many of the flow values needed in the algorithm 
will usually be unknown. 
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The MFM flow paths can be used, however, to propagate flow information, i.e., to 
guess the unknown flow values. The idea is quite simple: if an unknown flow value is 
connected to a known one, the known value is propagated to the unknown. However, 
as different flow values can be more or less trustworthy, it is necessary to have several 
propagation rules. The implemented algorithm uses the following rules: 
l A flow value from a subgroup of more than one flow function is said to be 
validated. It has precedence over flow values supplied by single flow functions, 
when propagated both upstream and downstream in flow paths. 
l A single measured flow value is propagated to unmeasured flows, both upstream 
and downstream, if there is no other information available. 
l If two validated flow values should meet, the one which is propagated down- 
stream has precedence over the one propagated upstream. This does not imply that 
downstream propagation is better in some sense; it only serves to make the flow 
propagation behave consistently. 
l If two flow values from single flow functions should meet, the one which is 
propagated downstream has precedence over the one propagated upstream. Once 
again, this is an arbitrary decision to make the propagation work. 
l Guessed values are not propagated over balance functions, except when only one 
value is currently unknown or unguessed. 
Using these propagation rules, the system can provide both validated flows whenever 
there is enough redundant information, and guessed values for most flow functions in a 
network. 
Validation 
Each flow value has a corresponding validated flow attribute. This is set according to 
the following rules: 
l If a flow value is the only one in its subgroup, and it is surrounded by a consistent 
subgroup, its own flow value is overridden, and the flow of the surrounding group 
becomes the validated flow of the flow function. 
a In all other cases, the validated flow is equal to the corresponding measured flow. 
In addition to the presentation of validated flow values, the implementation also presents 
some subgroup information to the user: 
l A coloring scheme is used to separate the inconsistent subgroups in the graphical 
representation of the MFM model. Thus, the symbols of the flow functions in the 
different subgroups receive a light gray, gray, or dark gray rim, depending on which 
group they belong to. 
l Each flow function that is alone in its group is highlighted in red. 
The decision to explicitly mark all single subgroups is only one possible alternative of 
many. It is derived from the obvious possibility that the measured value in question 
probably is in error. It is very important to observe, however, that this is only probable, 
not certain. It is also possible, albeit with a lower probability, that all measurements 
of a larger, consistent subgroup is in error, while the single value is correct. The third 
possibility is that all the measurements are wrong. It is very important that these cases 
be taken into account when the results of the analysis are presented to the operator 
J.E. L.ursson/Artificial Intelligence 80 (1996) 29-93 45 
or higher level algorithm. This is the reason why the implemented system primarily 
displays information about the different consistent subgroups, 
It should be noted that the presentation of single subgroups as less trustworthy than 
validated groups rests on the assumption that all failure likelihoods are in the same 
order of magnitude. However, the method could be extended to use explicit measures 
of failure likelihood, and then a single value could be more trustworthy than a group of 
values. The same assumption is found in the flow propagation, where validated values 
have precedence over single values. This is aimed at giving some reliability to the 
guessed flow values of functions not connected to sensors. However, if there exists two 
inconsistent groups of measurements, each based on more than one sensor value, the 
guessing strategy of downstream propagation is arbitrary. 
The above description is based on the G2 implementation. In the C version, single 
downstream propagation is used instead. This still allows the method to detect any 
inconsistencies, but does not provide guessed flow values with even a minimal degree 
of reliability. In either case, the method is able to detect any possible inconsistency 
between flow measurements. 
Note also that the measurement validation method uses neither achieve nor condition 
relations. Instead, each flow structure is treated as a separate part, and no global inter- 
actions are considered. This makes the method behave very favorably when the problem 
size increases. Furthermore, if the MFM model is only to be used for measurement 
validation, neither goals nor means-end relations are needed, but the process may be 
described as a list of separate flow structures. This is not true of the other algorithms, 
however. 
Examples of measurement validation 
Let us dlemonstrate the method on a small example. The process consists of a storage 
tank, a pump, and two cylindrical tanks, see Fig. 8. The main goal of the process is to 
keep the water level in the tanks at a specified level. This is achieved by the primary 
mass flow, i.e., the circulation of water. Here, the storage tank has been modeled both 
as a source and a sink. One of the transport functions (the one that corresponds to the 
pump) depends on the subgoal that the pump motor has power, and this goal in turn is 
achieved by a secondary flow of electrical energy. The power support system is quite 
complicateld but has been modeled simply as a source, a transport, and a sink. All this 
can be seen in the MFM model in Fig. 9. 
Example 1.. Now assume that flow measurements are available from the outflow of the 
storage tank, the throughput flow of the pump, and the inflow, derivative, and outflow 
of the upper tank, and that these flows have the values as shown in Table 1. 
The situation described in Table 1 is also shown in Fig. 10, where only the concerned 
flow functions are found. The flow values are shown above the flow function symbols; 
the storage function realized by the upper tank has three values, corresponding the 
inflow, denivative of volume, and outflow. 
The flow of Fl and all the flows of F3 agree, and thus they form a consistent subgroup. 
The flow of F2 disagree, however, forming another subgroup, with only one function in 
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Fig. 8. The tanks process. Water is pumped from a storage tank, to a cylindrical tank, from where it flows 
down into another tank, and then back to the storage again. 
Fig. 9. An MFM model of the tanks process. The main goal is to keep the level of the upper tank correct, and 
it is achieved by a water flow. In order for the transport function F2 to be available, i.e., to keep the pump 
running, energy must be supplied. 
Table 1 
A set of flow measurement values 
flow of Fi 20 x 10e6 m3/s (outflow from storage) 
flow of F2 10 x lo@ m3/s (flow through pump) 
inflow of F3 20 x 10V6 m3/s (upper tank inflow) 
deriv of F3 0 x 10m6 m3/s (volume change) 
outflow of F3 20 x 10e6 m3/s (upper tank outflow) 
20 10 20 0 20 
Ft F2 F3 
Fig. 10. A flow path corresponding to Table 1. The flow of F2 disagrees from the rest, and there are two 
consistent subgroups, whereof one is single and surrounded. 
it. The system marks the two subgroups in different colors, thus notifying that there is 
an inconsistency. In this case it also marks F2 specially, as it is a single function group, 
and the validated flow value of F2 is set to 20 x 10V6 m3/s (the flow of the surrounding 
group 1. 
The consistent subgroup information has been shown in Fig. 10 with a shading system. 
In addition to this, the flow function F2 should also have a special marking, for forming 
a single function group. 
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Table 2 
A second set of flow measurement values 
41 
flow of Fi 10 x 10V6 m3/s (outflow from storage) 
flow of F2 unmeasured (flow through pump) 
inflow of F3 20 x 10e6 m3/s (upper tank inflow) 
deriv of F3 0 x 10M6 m3/s (volume change) 
outflow of F3 20 x 10m6 m3/s (upper tank outflow) 
Fl F2 F3 
Fig. 11. A flow path corresponding to Table 2. The flow value of F2 is propagated from the storage, where 
the measurements form a multiply validated and consistent subgroup. It can then be seen that Fi forms a 
single, (but not surrounded), subgroup. 
Table 3 
A third set of flow measurement values 
flow of Fi 20 x 10e6 m3/s (outflow from storage) 
flow of F2 20 x 10V6 m3/s (flow through pump) 
inflow of F3 10 x lo+ m3/s (upper tank inflow) 
deriv of F3 5 x 10e6 m3/s (volume change) 
outflow of F? 5 x 10e6 m3/s (upper tank outflow) 
Fl ~2 F3 
Fig. 12. A flow path corresponding to Table 3. Here there are two consistent subgroups which both consist 
of more than one measurement. The algorithm signals that the flows do not agree, but it cannot guess which 
ones that are correct. 
Example Z!. Now assume instead that the flow value of Fl is 10 x 10m6 m3/s and 
that the flow of F2 is not measured; a situation which is shown in Table 2. It would 
correspond to the flow function description of Fig. 11. In this case the system propagates 
the validated value of 20 x 10e6 m3/s from the inflow, derivative, and outflow of F3 
upstream to F2 (the value from the validated subgroup has precedence over the value 
of the single function Fl). It then observes that the flow of Fl does not agree with the 
guessed value of F2, and Fl is marked as a single failure. Its validated flow is not reset, 
however, since it is not surrounded by other flow values. 
Example 3. Further assume the situation described by Table 3, which is also found in 
Fig. 12. Here we have two consistent subgroups, each with more than one measurement 
to support it. This situation is difficult to assess, as many sensor values must be wrong. 
The system marks the two inconsistent groups, but takes no further action. Marking any 
particular value as wrong could be misleading and potentially dangerous. 
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10. Alarm analysis 
Most industrial processes are equipped with a large number of alarms. In a failure 
state it is quite usual that many of the alarms will trigger. Some of them will be 
directly connected to the primary sources of error, but others may be secondary, i.e., not 
connected to any failed equipment, but due only to consequential effects of the primary 
failures. In a failure state it is vital for the operator to separate the primary from the 
secondary alarms. 
Failure conditions for Jlow functions 
Every flow function may or may not be alarmed, i.e., be connected to a corresponding 
part of the process, in such a way that a measurement tells whether the function is 
currently available or not. However, the alarm conditions are limited according to the 
following rules: 
l A source is working if the current outflow F is less than the source’s maximum 
capacity FCaP: 
F < FcaP. 
If this condition is not fulfilled, the alarm locap is true. 
l A transport is working if the current flow F lies within an interval, specified in the 
design: 
40 < F 6 Fhi. 
If the flow F is below Fl, the alarm lo@w is true; if it is above Fhi hiflow is true. 
l A barrier is working if the current flow F is low enough, (approximately zero): 
IFI < et. 
If this condition is not fulfilled, the alarm leak is true. 
l A storage is working if the current volume V lies within a specified interval: 
40 < V < hi, 
and the following inequality is fulfilled: 
dV 
z-Fi+F, 6~1. 
If the volume V is lower than N,,, the alarm lovol is true, if it is higher than Vhi, 
hivol is true. If the expression within bars is less than -et the alarm leak is true; 
if it is larger than et the al-311 is true. 
l A balance is working if the following inequality is fulfilled: 
If the expression within bars is less than -et the alarm leak is true; if it is larger 
than ei the al-$11 is true. 
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FI F2 
Fig. 13. A connected source and transport. The source has a maximum outflow capacity, Fcap, and the transport 
has a working interval, 4, Q fi < Fhi. If the wanted outflow of the source goes over its capacity or if the 
actual flow through the transport leaves the working interval, alarms occur. 
l A sink is working if the current inflow F is less than the sink’s maximum capacity 
F cap: 
F < Fcap. 
If the condition is not fulfilled, the alarm locup is true. 
A method for alarm analysis 
Failure;s can only propagate from flow function to flow function in certain ways. This 
is a consequence of the failure conditions described above. Thus, some primary failures 
in some t;ypes of flow functions may cause secondary failures in the connected functions, 
while failures in others will not. An example is given in Fig. 13, where a source Fl is 
connected. to a transport function F2. This could correspond to, e.g., a tank connected 
to a pump. 
The source has an output flow F$, which must lie beneath the maximum capacity, 
F cap, of the source. Thus, the following inequality must hold: 
F, 6 Fcap. 
If it does not, either because the capacity Fcap has fallen or because the output flow F, 
has risen, the source will have a locup alarm. 
The transport has a throughput flow F,, which must lie in between a lower and an 
upper limit, FIO, and Fhi, which are set during the design. Thus, the following inequalities 
must holdl: 
If they da not, the transport will cause one of two alarms. If Ft < FI,,, the alarm will be 
loflow; if Ft > Fhi, the alarm will be hi$ow. 
Note th,e normative character of these assumptions. Here, the working interval of the 
transport must be decided during the design and modeling phase. 
Assume further that the output flow or the source is controlled by the throughput flow 
of the transport, so that during normal operation: 
and that the working interval of the transport is small enough so that Fcap is always 
outside it during normal working conditions. Then the following analysis can be per- 
formed: 
l If the capacity Fcap of the source should fall below the desired outflow, the transport 
will not get enough flow medium, and its throughput flow Ft will be forced out of 
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and below the working interval, Thus, if the source loses its capacity, the transport 
cannot keep its flow within the correct limits. This implies that a locap alarm of a 
source will force a tofrow alarm in the connected transport function. 
l If, on the other hand, the current hroughput flow of the transport should become 
higher than the upper limit of the working interval, i.e., Fr rises above & because 
of some fault, this may or may not lead to the output flow of the source going 
above the m~imum capacity FCGp. Thus, a ~~~u~ alarm of a transport may cause 
a bucffp alarm in a connected source. 
I If the current hroughput flow of the transport should fall below the lower limit of 
the working interval, the flow demanded from the transport will still be below the 
source’s capacity, and the source will not be affected. Thus, a luj&w alarm of a 
transport will not cause any alarm in a connected source. 
This analysis can be expressed very simply and crisply in two rules, where all the 
quantitative information is suppressed and only the alarm information used: 
l A source locap alarm will force the connected transport to have a ~~~~~ alarm. 
e A transport hQ‘7ow alarm may cause a connected source to have a locap alarm. 
With the use of these two rules for how faults may cause other faults, and thus, how 
alarms may cause other alarms, any alarm situation concerning a source connected to a 
transport may be analyzed. 
Assumptions of flow function behavior 
In the examples above, the different working condi~ons gave rise to a set of assump- 
tions of how the flow functions involved will react when connected to each other. Using 
such assumptions for all flow functions, a small G2 program was written to automati- 
cally generate rules for all possible alarm causations [68]. In fact, a set of rules was 
first generated by hand; and when the automatic rule generation program was ready, the 
previous hand-generated rules where checked and found to be correct. 
Possible secondary alarms 
The examples can be extended to all the allowed connections of flow functions. 
This gives a set of rules for how an alarm in one flow function may or will cause 
consequential arms in the connected functions. A complete set of rules is as follows: 
l A source tocup will force the connected transport to have a loffow. 
l A transport lo$ow may cause a storage connected at the inlet of the transport o 
have a hid, and a storage connected at the outlet to have a 15voE. It may cause 
another transport connected in the same direction via a balance to have a /O&W. If 
the balance has no other connections the same alarm will be forced. 
l A transport hi;flow may cause a connected source or sink to have a locup. It may 
cause a storage connected at the inlet of the transport to have a lovol, and a storage 
connected at the outlet to have a h~voZ. It may cause a transport connected in the 
same direction via a balance to have a hiflow. If the balance has no other connec- 
tions, the same alarm will be forced. It may cause another transport connected in 
the opposite direction via a balance to have a loJlow. 
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l A barrier leak may cause a transport connected via a balance to have a lojibw, or 
a h$ow. 
l A storage lovol may cause an outgoing connected transport to have a lojlow. 
l A storage hivol may cause an incoming connected transport to have a lo~Iow, and 
it may cause an outgoing connected transport to have a hijow. 
l A storage leak may cause the same storage to have a 10~01. 
l A storage jll may cause the same storage to have a hivol. 
l A balance leak may cause a connected outgoing transport to have a lojow, and a 
connected incoming transport to have a hiflow. 
l A balance fill may cause a connected incoming transport to have a lojlow, and a 
connected outgoing transport to have a hi$ow. 
l A sink locap will force the connected transport to have a 1oJlow. 
l An alarm in a network will force a function depending on this network to fail. 
Note that the final rule makes use of means-end relations. Thus, even if most of the 
algorithm is concerned with comparing alarms of functions in a single flow structure, 
information may propagate upwards in the model graph, and a single alarm may ulti- 
mately affect the failure states of all goals and networks above it all the way up to the 
toplevel goals of the entire model. 
Different rule sets for different domains 
The rule set presented above is one reasonable solution of how to choose the possible 
secondary alarms. However, it rests on several assumptions about the behavior of flow 
functions. If these assumptions are changed, new rule sets are needed. This point may 
be illustrated by some examples: 
l One possible assumption is that active transports will not be forced into a hifrow 
state, even if they are connected via a balance to another transport which has a 
hipow. This corresponds to the case of two rotor pumps connected with a pipe, 
and the assumption is that the first pump cannot force the medium to flow quicker 
through the second one. The obvious counter-assumption s to allow one transport 
hifow to cause another further down the line. The latter is the normal case in the 
rules above. 
l Another assumption is that storages have a limited volume and are closed, i.e., 
a stlorage hivol may cause a 1ofTow in an incoming transport. If a storage may 
overflow, this causation will not take place. The first assumption was used in the 
rulers above. 
The solution to these ambiguities is to allow several types of flow functions, e.g., as 
has been shown above, in the separation of active and passive transports. Likewise, it 
would be: possible to allow closed and ove$owing storages. However, this may lead to 
a plethora of almost similar flow functions and make it more difficult to understand the 
MFM models. 
Anothla possibility is to design different rule sets, and use the most appropriate one 
for specific processes, equipment, and design tasks. In this case, the choice of flow 
function assumptions i made once and for all in the beginning of the modeling process. 
This would still leave the problem of how to mix MFM models from different domains, 
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however. 
The possibility of different assumptions on flow function behavior and, consequently, 
of different rule sets, rises several interesting questions. For example, what different rule 
sets could be proposed, and how would they differ in properties and in applicability to 
different domains or processes? And given some different rule sets, how should the best 
one for a certain task be chosen? It might even be possible to provide several rule sets 
and have the supervisory monitoring and control system choose the appropriate one as 
a part of the diagnosis. 
The choice of assumptions, i.e., the choice of flow function semantics, as well as the 
choice of flow functions types, is made from a very large number of possible abstractions 
of behaviors of flow systems, and rather than being a theoretical problem of enumerating 
all possibilities and investigating their different properties, it is the author’s opinion that 
the selection of flow functions and their semantics is ultimately an engineering problem. 
The first step on the way to deciding which rule sets are preferable is to gain practical 
experience of construction and use of MFM models, and this is an ongoing effort. 
Higher order rules 
The rule set shown contains only rules involving two or three tightly connected flow 
functions. At a first glance, it would seem possible that there could exist cases where a 
fault causation either involved more flow functions, or involved flow functions separated 
by two or more other functions. 
There are no such cases, however, as can easily be seen from the fact that the only 
type of flow function that allows propagation of a faulty flow value without having an 
alarm of its own is the balance. As balances may not be connected to each other, the 
longest chain of fault causation is three flow functions long, and there is a balance in 
the middle. All other causations involve only pairs of directly connected flow functions. 
An alarm analysis algorithm 
The rules above can be used for automated alarm analysis. Given a set of alarms, it is 
possible to decide which of the alarms that must be primary ones, and which ones that 
may be secondary. It is important to observe, however, that one cannot be certain that 
a fault is indeed secondary; there might be multiple faults, and a primary fault may be 
“hidden” by a causation, i.e., look like a secondary fault. Thus, the method differentiates 
between positively primary alarms, and alarms that may be either primary or secondary, 
so-called indeterminate alarms. In this article, the concept “secondary” is always taken 
to mean the same as “failed and indeterminate”. It should be noted that this is not a 
peculiarity of MFM. It is a basic property of all causal analysis. 
As soon as a new alarm value is discovered, the corresponding alarm of the concerned 
flow function is set to an alarm value, e.g., a transport loJow, a storage hivol, or a balance 
fill. Then all rules that can be applied to the new alarm are tried, in order to see if they 
match the new situation. If so, the failure state of one or several flow functions may 
change, from normal to primary failed or secondary failed. 
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Fig. 14. A storage connected to two transports. If the alarm state of the storage is not measured, while both 
transports receive lofrow alarms, the order of the alarms will determine which of them that will be considered 
primary. This can be. solved by a conflict resolution mechanism, however, which recognizes the case and sets 
both transpoa. larms to secondary failed. 
The rules are only applied locally and involve two or three closely connected flow 
functions. The only way global information is propagated is via the connections in the 
MFM graphs. Thus, the efficiency is proportional to the length of the networks and the 
depth of the abstraction hierarchies. This makes the execution very fast. 
Unknown alarm states 
When some alarm states are unknown, the flow networks can be used to guess the 
missing values. This method is called consequence propagation. The idea is simple. 
Given a set of known (primary and secondary) alarms and a set of unknown alarm 
states, the unknown values are filled in with secondary (i.e., indeterminate) alarms 
according to a set of rules. 
The rules used for this exactly correspond to the alarm analysis rules. Every such rule 
can be converted to a guessing rule, to be used in case the flow function in question is 
not given an alarm state from measurements. 
For example, two consequence propagation rules may be formulated for the source 
and transport in Fig. 13: 
l If there is a source locap alarm, then guess a loJIow alarm in a connected transport. 
l If there is a transport hifow alarm, then guess a locap alarm in a connected source. 
ConJIct rfsolution 
There are cases where conflicting guesses would be possible. Consider the situation 
shown in Fig. 14. Assume that the alarm state of the storage F2 is not measured, while 
those of the transports Fl and F3 are. Further assume that first Fl and then F3 has 
lojIow alarms. The guess for the alarm state of F2 would be a 20~01, and the alarm of 
F3 could be a consequence of this. 
If, however, the lojlow of F3 came before that of Fl, the guess would be a hivol for 
F2, and now the alarm of F3 would be considered primary instead. Thus, there are cases 
where the order of the alarms would give rise to different results. 
This situation can be remedied with a conflict resolution strategy, which is quite sim- 
ple; it gives preference for as many secondary, (i.e., indeterminate), alarms as possible. 
For example, in the case above, both transport alarms should be considered indetermi- 
nate. This conflict resolution gives rise to some further diminishing of the diagnostic 
resolution and more complexity in the rules, but the resulting interpretation is always 
correct. This actually corresponds to a “wait and see” step, because if the fault of 
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F3 was indeed a primary one, this would be discovered if the fault of Fl was reme- 
died. 
Measurement faults 
Sensor faults are common sources of false or incorrect alarms. In such cases the 
state of the process will not be correctly shown in the alarm presentation, and situations 
where this occur can be very dangerous. 
The method described is not aimed at discovering incorrect alarms. Instead it is 
sensitive to false alarms and largely dependent on correct sensor values. However, some 
cases can be detected as situations where the alarm state contains a sensor fault. This 
is true when one alarm will force another. If the latter alarm is not active, something is 
wrong with the measurements leading to one (or more) of the alarm states. 
Implementations 
The description above is based on the G2 implementation, which uses generic rules 
to implement the alarm analysis. The method has also been implemented in C and 
Common Lisp. The C version uses a table driven algorithm instead of rules. This has 
resulted in even faster execution, see Section 14. 
Using the results 
The result from applying the described method is that alarms will be marked as either 
primary or indeterminate. An operator or algorithm can then use this information in the 
task of finding the primary faults in a fault situation. 
An obvious strategy for the user is to first check the faults known to be primary. 
When these have been remedied, most of the indeterminate faults will also be gone, 
while some may instead have become primary. These should then be taken care of. 
It is possible, however, to use other knowledge to guide the search through the alarms. 
If failure likelihoods are known or can be guessed, they can be used for ordering the 
actions of the operator. Likewise, if one alarm is more important or dangerous than 
another, it may be investigated first, although it is indeterminate and other primary 
alarms remain. This knowledge is heuristic in nature, and should be clearly separated 
from the results of the alarm analysis. It may, for example, be implemented using a 
standard rule base to discriminate between different situations and giving advice on 
which actions to take first. 
Examples of alarm analysis 
Let us now demonstrate the method on an example. Once again the tanks process will 
be used 
Example 4. Assume that the functions Fl, F2, F3, and F5 have measurements connected 
to their alarm states, while F4 and F6 have not. Further assume that Fl has a locap, F2 
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Fig. 15. An alarm analysis ituation. The functions Fl , F2, F3, and F5 have locap, ZO~ZOW, and lovol &~Is. 
The alarms of F4 and F6 have been guessed. In this situation, the locap of Fl is the only primary alarm. 
TFZ R i-4 F5 
Fig. 16. Another alarm analysis ituation. Here the fofIow of F2 must be primary, as there is an alarm in the 
achieving network (the lofiow of F9). 
Fig. 17. A third alarm analysis ituation. Here there are three primary alarms. The situation is highly dynamic. 
a lojbw, F3 a Zovol, and F5 a lovol alarm. This alarm situation is shown in Fig. 15. The 
shading of the flow function symbols is used to indicate the failure state (a dark shade 
means a primary alarm, a lighter shade an indeterminate alarm, and white a normal or 
unalarmed state). This would correspond to the plethora of alarms that could appear in, 
say, a complicated fault situation in a larger plant, although this situation is, of course, 
far simpler. 
An application of the presented methods will result in that the locap of Fl must be 
a primary alarm, while the loflow of F2 and the lovol of F3 may be secondary. The 
consequence propagation implies that F4 and F6 might have had loflow alarms, had they 
been measured. Thus, assuming that F4 has a Zofow alarm, the alarm analysis can also 
conclude that the lovol of F5 may be a secondary alarm. The result is that the locap of 
Fl is the only primary alarm, while all the others may be consequences of it. This has 
been shown with the shading in Fig. 15. Fl is the source function of the storage tank, 
and the sole cause of the fault situation could thus be that there is too little water in 
that tank. 
Example !L If the function F9 (transport of electrical energy to the pump motor) was 
to have an alarm also, the last rule in the rule set (the rule concerning causation via 
the achieve and condition relations), would imply that F2 (the pump) also had had a 
primary fault, i.e., there would now be at least two primary faults: no power supply for 
the pump iand too little water in the storage tank, see Fig. 16. 
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Example 6. If instead F3 had a hivol alarm, the algorithm would conclude that there 
were three primary alarms, the locup of Fl, the hivol of F3, and the Zovol of F5, see 
Fig. 17. This would correspond to a dynamic process state, where the pump flow and 
the volumes of the lower and storage tanks were too low, while the volume of the upper 
tank was too high. 
11. Fault diagnosis 
The classical use of knowledge-based systems in process control is to aid the process 
operator in diagnosing faults. This is usually done by a rule-based expert system, running 
the rules in backward chaining. The techniques are well known, a good example being 
MYCIN [ 1121. However, rules-based systems have several shortcomings, for example 
that each rule base is specific for a certain process and task, a rule base may contain 
inconsistencies, and a large rule base most probably will do so, a large rule base is 
difficult to overview, both in building and updating, and a rule-based system can only 
diagnose the faults anticipated in the design of the rule base. 
These shortcomings can be solved to a large degree by using model-based approaches. 
The process of design, construction, and updating of the knowledge database can be 
made more efficient, if the models are intuitive and easy to use for the domain expert. 
Consistency within the model can often be guaranteed, and the model can be used to 
find any deviation from the working state and not only prespecified faults. MFM shares 
all these properties with other model-based approaches. 
The MFM data structure for diagnosis 
In MFM the means-end dependencies are explicitly represented, so when a certain 
control goal fails, i.e., a fault occurs, the model will provide information on which 
functions that may be in error, and thus, in which component subsystems the reasons 
for the failure can be found. 
The working conditions for flow functions used in the fault diagnosis algorithm are 
the same as used in alarm analysis. Thus, each flow function might be in a normal or 
working state, or have a fault, more or less directly corresponding to a locup, loflow, 
hi$ow, 10~01, hivol, leak, or$ll. 
The fault diagnosis algorithm must have a way of finding out the failure states of 
the physical components corresponding to the different flow functions. Thus, each flow 
function may have a question to be asked, or a test to be performed, in order to 
investigate the failure state of the function. Alternatively, automatic sensor readings may 
be used. Each flow function can also have a remedy of the fault, in the form of a text 
string to be output by the algorithm, or an automatic procedure to call. 
As an example, we will once again use the flow model of the tanks process. In order 
to enable a fault diagnosis, the different flow functions should be assigned questions: 
l The source Fl could have the question “Zs there water in the storuge tank?’ 
associated to it, together with the remedy “Fill water in the storage tan/?. 
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l The transport F2 could have the question “Is the pump transporting water?’ but 
no remedy, as the pump has a supporting system enabling it to run. The remedies 
would probably be taken care of in that system. 
l The storage F3 could have the question “Zs the water level of the upper tank 
correct?“, but it could also have a special rule associated to it. This rule could be 
activated by the algorithm and use an external measurement o set the failure state 
of the flow function. The remedy could be “The water level of the upper tank will 
be corrected by other actions”. 
l The rest of the flow functions in the water network could have similar questions 
and remedies. It is also possible, however, that some of the flow functions had no 
questEons or remedies. These would simply be skipped by the algorithm. 
l The source F8 in the electrical energy network could have the question “ZS power 
available?“. 
l The transport F9 could have the question “Zs the power switch on?” and the remedy 
“Switch on the power”. 
Note that the above assumptions are for use in the following example. When the al- 
gorithm is used as part of a monitoring and control system, that system would handle 
both questions and remedies. Thus, it would be a better solution to connect the MFSI 
model to a, model of physical structure, and use the latter to formulate questions, re- 
ceive measurements, and to provide remedies. This solution is used in the Guardian 
project. 
The search strategy 
An MFM model consists of information about the goals of a process, how these goals 
are achieve,d by networks of functions, how the functions depend on subgoals, and how 
they are realized by physical components. In a standard rule-based expert system, this 
information structure is implemented in rules, but in MFM it is explicitly described. 
Thus, a fault diagnosis can be easily implemented, as a search in the model graph. The 
strategy usled for this search is as follows: 
The fault diagnosis algorithm traverses the MFM graph, and when it comes to single 
flow functions it uses questions or sensor readings to find the failure state of those 
flow functions. Depending on the answers or sensor readings, parts of the flow model 
may not have to be traversed. The algorithm is combined with the alarm analysis and 
consequence propagation, which is performed incrementally as information comes in, 
and interleaves with the diagnosis algorithm. The simple rule for successful matching of 
diagnosis and consequence propagation (i.e., guessing of consequences), is that every 
flow function should have either a diagnostic question/sensor reading or be subject to 
guessing. 
The specifics of the diagnostic search are as follows: 
l The user chooses a goal for diagnosis. If this is a toplevel goal, the whole model 
(and ,thus the whole process) will be investigated. However, the goal chosen can 
also be a subgoal, in which case only part of the process will be diagnosed. 
l The search propagates downwards from the goal, via achieve relations, into the 
connected network of flow functions, each of which is now investigated. 
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l Each flow function may have a diagnostic question, which is asked in order to 
find out whether the corresponding physical component is currently realizing the 
function, i.e., whether the function is available or not. Alternatively, there can be a 
rule or relation to a physical component, whereby information about the working 
order of the function may be found. 
l The appropriate alarm state of the flow function is set, and the alarm analysis and 
consequence propagation algorithms are activated. 
l If a flow function conditioned by a subgoal is found to be at fault, or has no means 
of being checked, the connected subgoal is recursively investigated. If, however, a 
function is working, that part of the subtree is skipped. 
The fault diagnosis method has been implemented as a group of generic rules, which 
yields an incremental and local algorithm. It should be noted that the search propagates 
along static connections. Thus neither global search, pattern matching, nor conflict 
resolution is needed, and the algorithm is very efficient. 
The description above is, once again, based on the G2 implementation. The method 
has also been implemented in C and Common Lisp, in the form of recursive procedures 
performing a depth-first search. This enables even faster execution. 
As is shown in Section 14, the speed of the fault diagnosis algorithm is so high that it 
may seem unnecessary to select which parts of the Ml34 model to investigate. Instead, 
why not simply check all goals and functions, one after the other? This approach has 
been taken in the PERFECT project [ 108-l 111. However, the speed of the diagnosis 
is not determined by the search algorithm alone. The questions and sensor readings 
may be costly in time and other resources, or involve simulation and other computa- 
tions, etc. Due to this, it will often be important to keep the number of questions and 
sensor readings down and to direct the diagnosis to as small parts as possible of the 
process. 
An example of fault diagnosis 
Let us now demonstrate the method on a small example. Once again, the tanks process 
will be used. 
Example 7. Assume that the level of the upper tank is not correct, i.e., the goal Gi is 
violated, and that the user asks for a diagnosis of that goal. The algorithm starts at the 
goal Gl, i.e., the topmost goal, and moves down into the network describing the mass 
(water) flow and checks the flow functions in turn. 
The source Fl describes the source function of the storage tank, and is the first flow 
function to be reached by the search algorithm. The current position is marked in the 
graphic representation of the flow model, see Fig. 18. The source Fl has the following 
question associated to it: 
Q: Is there water in the storage tank? 
The user checks this and discovers that there is almost no water left in the storage tank. 
Thus he gives the answer “no” and Fl is marked with a Zocap. The alarm analysis is 
activated but can draw no further conclusions, see Fig. 19. 
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Fig. 18. The diagnostic search started from the goal Cl, followed the achieve relation down into the water 
flow network, and has reached the source Fi. 
Fig. 19. The diagnostic search has concluded that the source Fl is faulty. Then it has moved on to reach the 
transport F2. 
Fig. 20. The diagnostic search has concluded that the transport F2 was at fault, and the alarm analysis ignals 
that the fau:lt of Fl is primary, while the fault of F2 may be secondary. Then the search has reached the 
storage F3. 
The algorithm now moves on to F2 and asks the following question: 
Q: Is the pump running? 
Once again, the answer is “no” and F2 is marked with a lo&w alarm. The alarm analysis 
is activated and deduces that the locap of Fl must be a primary fault, while the lofow 
of F2 may be caused by the fault of Fl, see Fig. 20. 
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Fig. 21. The diagnostic search has finished its investigation of the water flow network, and the alarm analysis 
concludes that there is one primary fault, three secondary, and two guessed faults, at F4 and F6. As the 
transport F2 was at fault and there is a condition relation, the search has continued own to the energy supply 
network and has reached the source F8. 
The storage function F3 corresponds to the upper tank. It could have a question 
associated to it, that asked whether the volume of that tank was within the correct limits. 
Assume, however, that it is connected to a level alarm sensor. It will automatically be 
assigned a lovol alarm. Before the diagnosis has started, this alarm was considered 
primary, but once the Zofow of F2 has been established, the alarm analysis algorithm 
decides that it may be a consequential fault. 
The transport function F4 corresponds to the gravitationally caused outflow from the 
upper tank. It has no alarm and no question, so here the consequence propagation will 
be used to guess the alarm state, which will be a loj?ow. 
The storage F5 corresponds to the lower tank, and is also connected to an alarm 
sensor. Under the reasonable assumption that the level of this tank is too low, it is 
automatically marked with a Zovol, and the algorithm can now use the guessed loj?ow 
of F4 to decide that the Zovol of F5 can also be a consequential fault. 
The flow functions F6 and F7 are neither alarmed or have questions; thus the algorithm 
would guess that F6 has a loflow alarm, while F7 is in a normal (working) state. All 
this can be seen in Fig. 21. 
As there was a fault in F2, the algorithm now goes down in the subtree below it, and 
starts diagnosing the goal G2. It moves further down, finds the source F8, see Fig. 21, 
and asks the question that belongs to it: 
Q: Is power supplied? 
The user checks that the power line is connected to the wall, and that other equipment 
seems to have electrical power; then he gives “yes” as the answer. 
When the algorithm comes to the transport F9, see Fig. 22, which corresponds to the 
power switch of the pump, it asks the following question: 
Q: Is the power switch on? 
The user discovers that the power switch is in the “off” position and answers “no” 
to this question. The transport function F9 is marked with a lo&w alarm. The alarm 
analysis now deduces that the fault of F2 was indeed primary, as there is a fault in 
its support system. The total fault situation is thus that there are two independent 
LE. L.arsson/ArtQ%zial Intelligence 80 (1996) 29-93 61 
Fig. 22. Tine diagnostic search has concluded that the source F8 is working and reached the transport F9. 
Hg. 23. The state after the fault diagnosis. As the transport F9 is at fault, the fault in F2 is also a known 
primary faullt. The user may now ask for explanations and remedies, and the algorithm will search through 
the graph and output he appropriate t xt strings from the failed flow functions. 
causes of the level being to low; there is not enough water in the storage tank, and 
the pump power switch is not on, see Fig. 23. This system state will probably not 
last very long, however, as the water presently in the two cylindrical tanks will flow 
down into the storage tank and fill it up, thus making the source function Fl available 
again. 
Example 8. The implemented system also allows the flow functions to have explanations 
and remedies associated with them, and these can now be asked for. In the example, the 
algorithm would go through the different primary faults. When Fl is reached, it would 
output the following remedy: 
R: EN water in the storage tank. 
When it reaches the power switch, F9, it would output another emedy: 
R: Syvitch on the power. 
So far, the examples built within the G2 implementation has used this simple strat- 
egy of outputting one remedy text for each failed function. Another possibility would 
be to have the system activate rules or procedures to produce explanations and reme- 
dies using information from the whole MFM model, or to actually perform remedying 
actions. The rules and procedures needed should be written in the general G2 rule 
format. 
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“The diagnosis is that the goal Gl, (maintain the water level of the upper tank), 
is not fuljlled. This is due to the failure of Fl, (the storage tank’s ability to 
provide water), and F2, (the pump), which are not working. F2’s failure is 
caused by the fact that the goal G2, (provide the pump with power), is not 
fulfilled. This is due to the failure of F9, (the pump’s power switch), which is 
not working.” 
Fig. 24. An explanation of the failure state in Examples 7 and 8. The text was copied from the screen of the 
MFM Toolbox in C. The expressions within brackets are textual descriptions associated with each goal and 
function. Some formulations are clumsy, but the example is intended to show the system’s ability to generate 
explanations, not to produce correct natural language. 
Generation of explanations 
The C and Common Lisp versions of the fault diagnosis were enhanced with an 
algorithm for automatic generation of explanations in a restricted natural language style. 
This algorithm is implemented as a recursive depth-first search, that reads the fault states 
of the MFM model objects and builds a textual explanation as it moves down the graph. 
This algorithm uses information about the fault state of the whole MFM model, and 
can produce reasonable causal explanations of why goals and functions depending on 
other goals and functions have failed. An example output is shown in Fig. 24. 
When the fault diagnosis algorithm is used as a part of a larger monitoring and 
diagnosis system, the explanations and remedies should be handled in cooperation with 
other algorithms. For example, in the Guardian project, the automatically generated 
explanations will be used in communication with the intensive-care unit personnel, but 
once the fault diagnosis has computed a set of failed functions, i.e., diseases, treatments 
for these will be handled by a separate treatment database and a treatment plan generator. 
Guardian also monitors the execution of these plans. 
12. Experimental experiences 
No matter what the theoretical properties of diagnostic algorithms are, their utility will 
ultimately be decided by their practical usefulness. Different properties of the methods 
will add up to determine their relative merit. 
MFM is a new and largely untested modeling concept, and it differs from most other 
model-based approaches, conceptually as well as in detail. Thus, before any of the 
above-mentioned properties can be assessed, further experiences of modeling and use 
are needed. Therefore, the best we can do currently, is to present the experiences gained 
from some of the models that have been constructed. 
Three test processes 
The algorithms described above have all been tested on simulations of the tanks 
process, Steritherm, and the Guardian model of the human body. 
The tanks process is a small laboratory process used in teaching basic control theory 
at the Department of Automatic Control, Lund Institute of Technology, Lund, Sweden. It 
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Fig. 25. The Steritherm flow sheet (screen dump from the G2 Toolbox implementation). 
was used aL.s the generic “toy” example during the development of the MFM algorithms, 
and to produce the examples used in this article. As has been shown, it suffices for 
demonstrating all three algorithms. 
Steritham is a widely used, moderately sized process for ultra-high temperature 
treatment ((UHT) of dairy products, see Fig. 25. Steritherm is a real process in world- 
wide use, but it is still small enough to be of manageable size for an academic research 
project. It was the target process used in the Swedish project “Knowledge-Based Real- 
Time Control Systems” [ 3-9,631, of which the author’s doctor’s project was an informal 
part. 
The MF’M model of Steritherm describes the toplevel goal of sterilizing the liquid 
foodstuff, and how this is done by heating the product to 137’C for a few seconds. The 
main flow of thermal energy is modeled in detail, and in addition to this, the supporting 
flows of product and water for heating and cooling are described. Some other support 
systems, such as pressurized air and the 220 and 380 Volt electrical systems have not 
been included in the model. 
The measurement validation algorithm has been verified using the fairly complex 
product m,ass flow of Steritherm. The alarm analysis was tested on the thermal energy 
flow, and the fault diagnosis on faults which had effects on the entire plant. All tests 
were on realistic fault situations. The conclusion was that all three algorithms worked 
accurately and gave correct and useful information. They all managed to handle multiple 
faults without problems. It may also be noted that no changes whatsoever were necessary 
when transferring the algorithms from the tanks process to Steritherm. 
The Guardian project aims at developing a monitoring and diagnosis system for 
use with post-operative intensive-care patients [ 401. The system is implemented as an 
intelligent agent, which can use several different reasoning methods, according to the 
changing demands and available resources. It is based on the BBI blackboard system 
architecture [ 38,391. 
For the Guardian project, a large MFM model of the human body has been devel- 
oped. It covers all the systems needed for intensive-care unit monitoring, such as the 
heart, circulation, the body fluid volume, the nutrition, respiration, body temperature, 
acid-base balance, the concentrations of sodium, potassium, calcium, and magnesium, 
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Table 4 
Three modeling tasks of different size. The times are fairly reasonable estimates of the man-hours used. Note, 
though, that the Guardian modeling effort is still not entirely finished 
Process Size Knowledge engineering Model construction 
Lab Tanks “‘toy” 0 1 hour 
Steritherm medium 2 months 1 week 
Guardian large 4 months 1 week 
and the, often multiple, regulatory mechanisms for all these systems. 
The two implemented algorithms (alarm analysis and fault diagnosis) have been 
verified and found to work without any problems on this model, which is probably the 
largest MFM model in existence. Judging from these experiences, it is clear that MFM 
algorithms cale favorably, without changing any qualitative properties in behavior or 
results. 
Reasonable assessments of the efforts needed to construct he three MFM models are 
shown in Table 4. The knowledge ngineering includes the time needed to study the 
process and to find out the physical facts of how it works, while the model construction 
time was used for identifying the goals and functions and constructing the actual MFM 
model. Since it is difficult in practice to completely compartmentalize the different 
phases from each other, the figures in Table 4 are approximations. As can be seen, the 
MFM specific effort is quite modest. Although no comparative studies are available, it 
is the author’s experience that the MFM modeling effort is much smaller than the effort 
needed to turn the same knowledge into a rule base. Furthermore, the model-based and 
graphical nature of MFM makes it considerably easier to handle MFM models, than to 
use knowledge ncoded in rules. 
13. Properties of the algorithms 
Using MFM to represent diagnostic knowledge has several clear advantages over 
using an ordinary rule-based system, and it may also retain some of these advantages 
in comparison with other model-based techniques. This is due to the fact that MFM 
models consist of static graphs. 
The algorithms are local and incremental. They work in real time, and propagate 
information along static links only. This makes them very efficient, and the effort as 
a function of model complexity increases at worst linearly with the size of the MFM 
models. The local nature also has the benefit hat feedback and recirculation loops pose 
no problems for the algorithms. 
Worst-case estimates 
Diagnostic reasoning tasks like the ones described above can be implemented as 
searches in MFM graphs. The fault diagnosis method uses a depth-first search, and as 
the size of every subtree is known, it is simple to obtain a worst-case stimate of the 
time or computational effort needed to diagnose a certain subgoal. Similar statements 
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are true for the other two algorithms. In general, it is possible to write diagnostic 
algorithms for MFM which will provide reliable and precise information of worst- 
case efforts. It is important to note, however, that in case the target process may shift 
operating mode, a different MFM model may be needed to describe the new goals and 
functions. In such cases, the monitoring and control system using the MFM algorithm 
must have a whole set of MFM models available, and worst-case estimates for each of 
these. 
Ham’ reakime demands 
The ability of giving worst-case estimates of the time needed for a diagnostic subtask 
makes MFM well suited for diagnosis under hard real-time constraints. Whenever a 
subtask must be finished in a fixed time, the known worst case can be used to test 
whether it is indeed possible to comply with the timing demands. If not, the subproblem 
in question cannot be solved. 
Here, the hierarchical structure of MFM models is quite valuable. The general structure 
of an MFM model is such that the toplevel goals and flow structures describe plant-wide 
goals and functions. The functions in these flow structures are conditioned by subgoals, 
each concerned with support systems for the main systems, and the functions here are 
in turn conditioned by smaller subsystems. 
For example, in an MFM model of a nuclear power plant, the toplevel flow structures 
would describe the flow of energy from reactor, via primary water system, to the 
generators, and the primary flow of water. On the next level there would be flow models 
of reactor, generators, etc., and on the next lower level models of reactor and generator 
subsystems. Measurements are usually available on all these different levels. 
The fault diagnosis algorithm presented above starts from the topmost goals, i.e., those 
goals that are most general and concern production and safety demands of the entire 
plant. Then the search moves downwards in the MFM graph and attacks more specific 
subproblems. Currently, the fault diagnosis search is implemented as a simple depth-first 
search, which investigates all levels to obtain a result. It would be a simple matter to use 
a breadth-first (or staged depth-first) search instead. This would allow the algorithm to 
first handle the toplevel, plant-wide diagnosis, and then gradually search deeper, making 
the diagnostic resolution finer and finer as more time was available. Whenever the time 
would run out, a more or less coarse diagnosis would be available. Thus, MFM allows 
graceful degradation under hard real-time constraints. 
Large scaling of problems 
MFM’s graphical structure makes the presented algorithms behave favorably when the 
problems are scaled up. All three methods increase at worst linearly with the size of the 
MFM model. However, most incoming data cause only local changes in the diagnosis, 
and very often, the computational effort increases less than linearly. For example, the 
cost of performing a fault diagnosis of one subpart of a model is not affected at all by 
adding another (separate) subpart. 
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The local, incremental updating of diagnostic information used in the three methods 
also enables them to be efficiently parallelized. Since the methods use only local infor- 
mation, there is no global bottleneck in the system. The distribution can be done in two 
different ways: 
l Each processor can be responsible for a specific subpart of the model. This corre- 
sponds to a standard distributed control and supervisory system, where each part of 
the process and thus of the MFM model has a designated processor. The topmost 
levels of the model will have to be handled by a globally responsible processor that 
gathers the information from the other processors. 
l Processors may be assigned to tasks on a server basis. When a new subpart of the 
MFM model must be traversed, this task is sent to a new processor. In this version, 
a fault diagnosis moving downwards in the MFM graph splits into several parallel 
branches. 
Once again note that although the algorithms themselves are so fast that a parallel 
implementation may seem unnecessary, other activities such as sensor readings, lower 
level simulations, asking questions, etc., may require enough time or other resources to 
motivate further increase of efficiency. 
14. Implementation 
The algorithms presented above have been implemented and tested in the real-time 
expert system tool G2, in C for Macintosh systems, and in Common Lisp for use in the 
Guardian project. All examples shown in this article have been tested in both the G2 
and C implementations. 
The first implementation was done in G2 and used this tool’s special graphical data 
structures and generic rules. The MFM models are built with G2’s standard graphical 
interface and each algorithm is implemented as a generic rule base, each of which 
is reasonably small, see Table 5. This implementation does not show the speed of 
the methods. Since G2 has a minimal sampling period of one second, each call to a 
diagnostic algorithm takes precisely 1 second. The system is commercially available and 
has been sold to CERN. G2 was developed by Gensym Corporation [89,90]. 
The second implementation has been done in C [ 691. The MFM data structures and 
algorithms are portable, but the graphics interface and file system is currently only 
available for Macintosh systems. This implementation enables the algorithms to be used 
in conventional monitoring and control systems, and it also highlights the efficiency of 
the algorithms. Since the fault diagnosis is the most time-consuming of the algorithms, 
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Table 6 
Performance data for fault diagnoses of the three models using the C implementation. “Objects” are the total 
number of MPM objects used in the model, “Rules” are the number of rules needed to perform an equivalent 
diagnosis with backward chaining, “Worst case” is the longest possible execution time for a fault diagnosis of 
the model, ancl “Rules per second” gives the apparent speed of the algorithm, should it have been performed 

















some performance data for it are shown in Table 6. Here, the fault diagnosis was executed 
using simulated sensor readings from a pregenerated fault situation. Note that the times 
given are for the worst case, i.e., when all objects of the model must be investigated. 
Often, a diagnosis is orders of magnitude faster, and the measurement validation and 
alarm analysis are faster still. The central part of the C code implementation of the fault 
diagnosis algorithm is given in Appendix B. 
The Lisp implementation described below includes a small translator that reads an 
MFM model and produces a rule base for performing the fault diagnosis algorithm 
with a standard backward chaining system. Each goal is translated into one rule, and 
each function into two, handling the cases when the function is working and failed, 
respectively. These rule bases were used to give a rough estimate of the complexity 
of the MFM models and the speed of the algorithms compared to that of standard 
rule-based systems. 
The relative difference in efficiency between the models is probably due to their 
different size. For the smaller models, some initializing and bookkeeping operations 
affect the execution times. 
It should be noted that the Guardian model poses a test with significant difficulties. 
It contains numerous loops in the means-end dimension (i.e., functions on one level 
depend on subfunctions, and these in turn depend on the original functions), and most 
of the flow structures consist of loops (since most of the flows in the human body are 
closed loops). The algorithms can handle all the classically difficult cases of feedback, 
recirculation loops, and circular dependencies without problems, though. 
15. An overview of related work 
The main contributions to MFM have been made by Morten Lind and his group. Lind 
[ 73,79,80] describes the basics of MFM, while [ 74,76,77] contains Lind’s suggestion 
for a diagnostic system. Lind has also treated real-time diagnosis [75], and design of 
operator interfaces [72]. Lind’s group has developed a graphical interface [24,94,95], 
a STRIPS planning system [ 61,621, a fault diagnosis system for ship engines [45], 
and a system for alarm analysis and fault diagnosis [ 171. [78] contains a comparative 
discussion of MFM and other types of models. 
MFM has also been used in nuclear safety research [ 11,201, in operator interfaces 
for fault diagnosis [ 231, for constructing COGSYS diagnostic systems [ 108-l 111, for 
68 J.E. L.ursson/Art$cial Intelligence 80(19%) 29-93 
fault diagnosis in process industry [ 124,125], and in intelligent man-machine systems 
for nuclear plants [ 871. 
The methods described in this article have been presented in earlier papers; measure- 
ment validation in [ 651, alarm analysis in [ 641, and fault diagnosis in [ 661. They have 
all been thoroughly described in the Doctor’s thesis [67], which is the basis for this 
article. The report [68] contains more detailed descriptions of the implementation of
the algorithms, while [69] reports on the C implementation. 
Model-based diagnosis 
The most thorough work in model-based iagnosis has arguably been done in research 
areas related to qualitative physics. The main bulk of the work of the Al community 
has concerned iagnosis of analog and digital electronic ircuits, but there has also been 
applications in neurophysiology, hydraulic systems, process industry, and other domains, 
see 1371. 
Since automatic reasoning usually does not need all the quantified etails of a math- 
ematical model, and because sometimes only knowledge about qualitative behavior is 
available, several qualitative representations have been suggested to replace mathemat- 
ical models in physics. Common approaches are to use representations based on, e.g., 
logics, constraints, or directed graphs. Sussman and Steele [ 1161 describe a system 
based on hierarchical constraints and consistency checking. Davis [ 181 describes the 
use of both structural and functional models in diagnosis. The area of qualitative physics 
is described in [ 31,126]. A good overview of model-based iagnosis is given in [ 371. 
[ 191 also gives a good overview, while [ 1221 gives a more theoretical overview and 
relates to standard expert system techniques. 
The theoretical foundation for several of these diagnostic methods is Reiter’s algorithm 
[ 35,107]. A model of physical structure and component behavior is used to generate 
a description of the target system in logic formulae. Together with information about 
measurements, Reiter’s algorithm is then used to compute the minimal set of possible 
hypotheses that is sufficient o explain the current (failed) state of the system. 
The method outlined above has been implemented in a domain independent architec- 
ture called the General Diagnostic Engine (GDE) , [ 541. GDE uses an assumption-based 
truth maintenance system (ATMS) , [ 50,5 11, and is a direct, incremental implementation 
of Reiter’s algorithm. 
Most of the results in this area concern digital circuits, but analog circuits and circuits 
containing components with internal states have also been addressed. There are also 
probabilistic approaches. All of this is excellently covered in [ 371. 
Other important approaches to qualitative reasoning have been taken by de Kleer 
and Brown [ 531, which points out the need for both topological and functional mod- 
els and formulates a theory based on confluences, by Forbus [30], which describes 
a modeling method starting with a physical description of a system, giving a set of 
constraints, and using the process concept o model behavior, and by Kuipers [ 58-601, 
describing a qualitative simulation method. The system starts with a set of qualita- 
tive constraints and an initial state, and can predict the set of possible futures for the 
system. Dvorak’s project [25,26] describes the MIMIC fault diagnosis ystem, based 
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on the QSIM language for qualitative simulation [58-601. The Inc-Diagnose system 
[92] also uses a QSIM representation. The DATMI program [22] uses a qualita- 
tive representation to maintain a set of measurement interpretations, and can diagnose 
sensor failures by tracing dependencies. This can be compared with the measurement 
validation algorithm presented in this article, although there are considerable differ- 
ences. 
A comparison 
It is important to note that MI34 differs from the “classical” kinds of model-based 
diagnosis, as exemplified by Reiter’s algorithm and GDE, in the typical target do- 
mains as well as in the basic problem formulation of the diagnostic task and in the 
results produced. The main contribution of Ml34 is that it extends the model-based 
research with new methods, well suited for application in process industry and control 
systems. 
The classical AI version of model-based diagnosis is clearly geared towards diagnosis 
of electronic circuits and similar domains. The models describe how components are 
connected into a physical structure, and the behavior of the more or less complex 
components are described by analog or discrete equations or constraints. From faulty 
behavior of the entire circuit, the diagnosis tries to isolate faulty components, often by 
using varying input signals, i.e., tests. 
MFM only handles a special class of behaviors; those which can be described by 
a small set of very abstract flow functions. Furthermore, it is assumed that the fail- 
ure state of each flow function can be observed from direct measurements or tests, 
and a diagnosis consists of a description of the fault state of the whole target system, 
and the casual reasons for this fault state. MFM is geared towards systems in pro- 
cess and nuclear industry and similar domains. For example, both the alarm analysis 
and fault diagnosis algorithms assume that there is a known desired state of the pro- 
cess. On the other hand, the use of varying inputs is quite often not possible in these 
domains. 
It is imeresting to note, though, that the project of Walseth et al. uses Ml34 to 
generate input to Reiter’s algorithm [ 124-1251. This is thus a very interesting effort 
with the goal of joining MFM and more classical model-based diagnosis. 
Another difference is that in MFM the concept of goals is central, while most classical 
approaches are not explicitly concerned with teleology. A notable exception is [49], 
where a teleological analysis is applied to electronic circuits. In this domain, de Kleer 
shows how the purposes of components can be obtained from an analysis of structure 
and function. However, in a more general and unconstrained case, this is not possible. 
Qualitative physics has proposed the principle of no function in structure, i.e., it is 
impossible: to conclude what function a component has from observation of its physical 
properties alone. In MFM, this principle is observed, and there is the equivalent principle 
that the goals of a system cannot be concluded solely from an analysis of its functions. 
For example, with no additional information, it is not possible to tell whether the purpose 
of a telephone is to enable electro-mechanical communication or to stop a door from 
closing. 
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An interesting question is to what extent MEM models are equivalent to other qualita- 
tive and quantitative models, and whether it would be possible to generate MFM models 
automatically from, say, a structure and behavior, QSIM, QPT, or other model-based 
representation. As with bond graphs, the answer is that most of these representations 
could provide the flow information needed for MFM, while they may not be suffi- 
cient in describing the means-end information, i.e., to define the goals of the target 
system. 
An important and quite interesting possibility is that Forbus’ Qualitative Process 
Theory (QPT) [ 301, and similar representations may indeed provide teleological infor- 
mation in the process concept. If so, it may be possible to device a translation between 
the two types of models. This is still a question open to research, however. 
The flow descriptions of MFM are less detailed than those of other models. Thus, 
these other models might be translated into MFM, but MFM flows will not suffice to 
produce other models automatically. In the dimension of more or less abstraction, MFM 
is at the most abstract end. However, it should be clear from the results reported in 
this article, that it can still provide valuable diagnostic results. The idea that abstraction 
yields efficiency is also presented in Hamscher’s XDE [ 361, a program that can diagnose 
complex circuits by using abstractions of behavior. 
It is also worth noting that, although no comparative study is available, the construction 
of MFM models most probably demands a lesser effort than many other model-based 
approaches, This tentative conclusion is based on the author’s experiences from the 
project “Knowledge-Based Real-Time Control Systems”, where models of Steritherm 
were built using quantitative simulation equations for the G2 simulator, quantitative 
constraint equations for DMP, and qualitative causal graphs for MIDAS. All these tasks 
demanded efforts larger than that needed to construct the MFM model of Steritherm, 
mainly because MFM is more abstract than the behavior models used, and it does not 
demand any detailed knowledge such as equations, constraints, etc. 
A practical difference between MFM and most other model-based techniques is that 
MFM methods can be very efficient. The MFM algorithms presented in this article 
perform diagnostic tasks in the time scale of microseconds, while a typical system 
based on Reiter’s algorithm is quite slow. Indeed, computations may become intractable 
for systems with more than a few tenths of components. In [ 521, de Kleer shows how a 
GDE system can increase its efficiency by several orders of magnitude, by concentrating 
the diagnosis to the probably faulty sections of the circuit, and to focus on the most 
probable faults only. This algorithm may perform poorly for certain symptoms, though, 
and (temporarily ignoring the difficulties in comparing two very different algorithms) 
it is still orders of magnitude slower than the MFM algorithms. 
A fuller overview of related work is given in Appendix A. 
16. Conclusions 
The article has presented three newly invented and implemented diagnostic methods 
for use with multilevel flow models, MFM. The methods use MFM as a database and 
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Fig. A.1. An overview of some different projects, according to model type used (columns), and the type of 
problem solved (rows). 
implemented in G2, C, and Common Lisp and successfully tested on several processes. 
The searc:h algorithms are all very efficient and work in real time, and their sensitivity 
to large scaling of models is at worst linear. Together with implemented toolboxes 
and demonstrations, the project shows a good example of the usefulness and power of 
means-end models. 
Appendix A. An overview of related work 
MFM is a young and largely unexplored research area. The current work is related to 
several other areas of research, such as (model-based) diagnosis, model-based reasoning, 
qualitative physics, and general modeling. This appendix will give an overview of 
previous work and related projects, and some overview papers and books are also 
mentioned. 
In the following overview, the different projects has been sorted according to the type 
of models they use, and in each group they are separated into different problem areas, 
such as f,ault diagnosis, simulation, presentation, etc. This has been summarized in Fig. 
A.l. 
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Projects using MFM 
Lind. Morten Lind is the creator of MFM. The most important documents about MFM 
are [73,79,80], where the basic ideas, the syntax, and semantics are defined. These 
reports give an introduction to the background of MFM, and works as the definition 
of Lind’s current version. Some examples are also given. [ 7 I] is the original paper of 
MFM. 
Lind’s solution for the data structures and diagnostic algorithms to be used under the 
MFM top layer is described in [ 74,76,77]. The implementation is done in Smalltalk 80. 
Together with a graphical interface for building MFM graphs, also written in Smalltalk 
[24,94,95], this forms the main effort of Lind’s group. 
De et al. Westinghouse Corporation used MFM to perform a functional analysis of a 
new control room concept for a pressurized water reactor in the early 1980s [ 201. 
Kjax-Hansen. Kjaer-Hansen has used MFM in the development of models of decision 
making processes [ 481. 
Measurement validation 
Larson. The only MFM method that treats measurement validation as a separate 
problem is the one described in Section 9 of this article. 
Creutzfeldt. The project described in [ 171 is partly concerned with measurement 
validation. The project treats sensor validation together with alarm analysis and fault 
diagnosis. It is a real-time diagnostic system, with low-level data collection routines 
written in Fortran. MFM models are manually translated into Nexpert Object rules, 
which handle the high-level processing. The system generates hypotheses and tests 
them by propagating values through the MFM graphs, thus performing a mixture of 
measurement validation, alarm analysis, and fault diagnosis. A working demonstration 
of the system exists, with a small heat distribution plant as target process, but the thesis 
is yet to be published. 
Alarm analysis 
Larson. A method for alarm analysis with MFM is presented in Section 10 of 
this work, and it seems to be the only one separately concerned with alarm analysis. 
However, the project of Creutzfeldt (see above) partly treats this problem. 
Fault diagnosis 
Several projects use MFM for fault diagnosis. 
Lind. Lind has described his approach to real-time diagnosis in [75], where it is 
argued that the structure of MFM models is well suited for fault diagnosis under hard 
real-time constraints. By searching top-down in the MFM graphs, it is possible to obtain 
algorithms that produce an answer with low resolution quickly and then can use any 
additional time to increase the resolution of the diagnosis. Each goal corresponds to a 
part of the diagnostic task, and as lower level subgoals are met, the diagnosis becomes 
finer and finer, thus giving a behavior similar to that of anytime algorithms [ 10,213. 
Creutzfeldt. Fault diagnosis is also the main aim of the Creutzfeldt project (see 
above). 
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Jorgensen. The thesis of Jorgensen [45] treats the problem of building general MFM 
models for diagnosis of ship engines, thereby aiding supporting reuse of modeling 
knowledge. 
Sassen et al. The Dutch project PERFECT uses a preprocessor to translate MFM 
models into CGGSYS programs for diagnosis [108-l 1 1 ] . The implemented method uses 
external measurement values to check the working condition of every leaf node in the 
MFM graph, and then propagates the fault information upwards, thus enabling the system 
to quickly find low-level faults, and then to use any additional time to give descriptions 
of the consequences on higher levels. An advantage with checking all leaf nodes is 
that they may be ordered according to failure likelihood, but a drawback is that all leaf 
nodes must be continually checked. The project has several points in common with the 
method described in Section 11 of this article. CGGSYS is a real-time expert system 
shell developed as a cooperation between 35 British and European companies. It is 
written in PIDP-I 1 and C, uses the text-based language KRL (Knowledge Representation 
Language) to describe the knowledge database, uses a blackboard architecture, and is 
designed to be quite efficient [ 141. The PERFECT system works as a compiler and 
translates MFM models into code for the COGSYS system. 
Sassen is part of the SCWERE project (Supervisory Control With Embedded Real- 
time Expert systems). This is a joint project between the faculties of Informatics, 
Electrical, Mechanical, and Chemical Engineering of Delft Technical University. The 
aim of the project is to support plant-wide control systems on a supervisory level using 
AI techniques in real time, see for example [ 105,106,117,118]. 
Larsson. Section 11 of this article presents a method for fault diagnosis using down- 
ward search in MFM graphs. 
Walseth. The Norwegian project of Walseth et al. uses MFM for diagnosis of a 
water/ammonia separation unit [ 124,125]. One contribution is the idea of connecting 
MFM goal s,atisfaction totests on quantitative state variables in the functions. The MFM 
model is then used to produce input to Reiter’s algorithm, which is the diagnostic vehicle 
for this project. 
Planning 
Larsen. One project of Lind’s group uses MFM to control the production of STRIPS 
plans for startup of plants [ 61,621. The standard way of using STRIPS for planning is 
to perform a search among applicable operators, in order to construct a viable plan, i.e., 
a sequence of actions that takes the process from initial to goal state. MFM contains 
information about which functions that must be available for a goal to be achieved, 
and the implemented system uses this information to control the (otherwise blind) 
search through operators. Sometimes this needs guessing and backtracking, and truth 
maintenance t chniques are used. For readings on STRIPS, see [ 281. 
Presentation. 
Lind. Lirtd has also treated presentation of means-end information and the design 
of operator .interfaces [ 721. The main idea is to use the graphical representation f the 
MFM models, combined with flow sheets and highlighting of functions and correspond- 
ing physical components. Another set of symbols and a graphical environment were 
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developed in the SIP project [ 811, but the new symbols have not been put to further 
use; this thesis uses Lind’s older versions. A part of the effort of Lind’s group is the 
development of a general graphics environment for MFM [24,94,95]. Lind has also 
cooperated with CEC-JRC Ispra in Italy. 
Duncan and Pmtorius. Duncan and Praetorius [23] use MFM as an alternative 
way of presenting diagnostic information to operators, and have made very interesting 
comparative experiments with students acting as inexperienced operators. The students 
received a few hours of training to find faults in an example process using either a 
standard flow sheet or an MFM model, and in this test, MFM proved to be more 
efficient than a flow sheet as a fault diagnosis aid. It should be noted, however, that the 
test did not involve trained operators, and that the test series was small. In spite of this, 
the result is very interesting, and clearly provides a good reason for further work with 
MFM as a means of presentation. To perform the test, Duncan and Pratorius developed a 
graphical presentation system for MFM. Sassen has later performed similar experiments. 
Businaro. Businaro et al. performed some studies of man-machine interfaces using 
MFM, in the mid 1980s [ 11 I. 
Monta et al. Toshiba is developing a supervisory control system for boiling water 
nuclear reactors. The system is based on design principles from cognitive science and 
uses MFM to represent plant knowledge for diagnosis. The system is scheduled to appear 
in the next generation of operator room software, and this may very well be the most 
comprehensive and interesting project so far. 
Larsson. Some ideas about and examples of presentation of means-end information 
are given in [67]. The conclusion is that MFM may be suitable for presentation, when 
integrated in a multiple view system, allowing several ways of presenting the same and 
related information. 
Projects using other functional models 
Several projects have used means-end and functional models, which are not pure 
MFM, but closely related. This means that some representation of goals, functions, or 
both is used; usually a tree or graph describing a hierarchy of goals or functions. 
Alarm analysis 
Modarres et al. The Goal Tree Expert System (GCYIRES) project uses a database 
of goal trees and success trees to perform diagnostic tasks. The representation consists 
of tree structures containing goals and subgoals on the higher levels, and hardware 
requirements, i.e., what components that must be working, on the lower ones. Thus, it 
clearly resembles MFM. This data structure has been used to implement the UMPIRE-I 
program, that helps to evaluate alarm systems [86]. The system is written in Common 
Lisp and runs on an IBM-PC/AT. It has been successfully tested on real processes. 
Padalkar et al. The Intelligent Process Control System (IPCS) uses hierarchical mod- 
els of structure and function to perform fault diagnosis [ 971. The system models fault 
propagation in graphs, and thus in fact performs an alarm analysis. The target process 
is described in hierarchical tree structures with a functional representation of functions 
and subfunctions, and a structural representation of systems and subsystems. Constraints 
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are used to find faulty components, and this information is then propagated downwards 
in the hierarchies, to find the lower level causes. In this way, a diagnosis with low reso- 
lution is quickly available, and then any extra time is used to improve the granularity of 
the diagnosis. The system has been tested successfully on a small power plant producing 
electricity and steam at the Senboku Works of Osaka Gas Company in Osaka, Japan. 
Fault diagnosis 
Modarres et ai. The GGI’RES system has also been used to perform fault diagnosis. 
The implemented program uses a depth-first search downwards in goal trees to find 
failures in equipment found in the leaf nodes [ 131. The system has been used to 
construct an on-line fault diagnosis expert system for an experimental nuclear reactor 
facility, and the results seem to have been satisfactory. 
Padalkar et al. The IPCS system of Padalkar et al. [97] deserves to be mentioned 
under fault diagnosis too, as it performs a mixture of alarm analysis and fault diagnosis. 
Allen and Rao. Fault trees describe a process and its possible faults in a tree struc- 
ture, where the toplevels of the trees contain alarms, while the lower levels contain 
components and subcomponents. A diagnosis consists of a search path through the tree 
from the root to one or several leaves, where the primary faults are found. See for 
example [ I 1. 
Planning 
Tomita et al. The project of Tomita et al. describes an automatic synthesizer of 
operating procedures based on functional models of plants. The system uses a heuristic 
search through automatically generated subgoals to construct operating sequences for 
chemical plants. The goal is to give operator support. The database contains directed 
graphs to give a qualitative description of the plant behavior, fragments of operating 
sequences, called scopes, which are used to construct plans in a bottom-up fashion, 
and scripts to help build plans top-down. Working plants are described as networks 
of scopes, where each scope corresponds to an abstract function or subfunction of the 
plant. Scripts describe the conditions for scopes to work, and are used as guidelines for 
constructing plans, consisting of sequences of scopes. The system has been applied to 
the startup of a practical chemical plant: a subprocess of an existing ethylene plant, and 
this application seems to have been successful [ 1201. 
Another system is specifically aimed at batch processes [ 1211. Here the data structure 
used is a tree of tasks and subtasks, which must be performed to ensure successful 
operation. The process itself is described as a directed graph, showing the physical 
topology of the plant. The operational knowledge is contained in a table of recipes, i.e., 
description of how to perform each possible task. The system uses the tree of needed 
subtasks to schedule a set of operations, using a linear programming technique, and then 
performs a quick simulation to check the result. 
Presentation 
Rasmussen. Rasmussen has thoroughly discussed the design of man-machine inter- 
faces and describes the importance of presenting means-end information in order to 
accomplish this, see for example [ 102,103]. Rasmussen has done a greatly original 
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work of structuring the tasks of operators and other users of man-machine systems, and 
of the behavior used for the tasks. Some tasks are usually performed on a skill-based 
level, which means a more or less automated or reflexive behavior. Other tasks, no- 
tably some kinds of diagnosis, are performed on a rule-based level, where reasoning is 
needed but the knowledge is expressed on a rather simple, symptom-action form. Yet 
other tasks, and especially the most complex and difficult ones, are performed on a 
knowledge-based level, which implies complex reasoning with the use of models. This 
structure is of paramount importance, since the different task levels fit differently well to 
be performed by operators and for being automated. The demands on an implementation 
are also very different depending on the task type; thus a skill-based task may be solved 
by conventional control techniques, while a rule-based task may be better solved by an 
expert system, and a knowledge-based task by a more advanced system for automated 
reasoning. Rasmussen’s contributions are very rich; the reader is referred to [ 1021 for 
an extensive overview. [ 1041 is a starting point for the ideas behind MFM. 
Modarres et al. The GOTRES representation has also been utilized as a database for 
an operator advisory system for operation of nuclear power plants [ 471. In this project, 
a Prolog implementation was used for building a small expert system. 
Simulation 
Several projects use functional models for generation of equations and simulation. The 
general idea here is to use a more abstract representation of a system’s behavior, and 
to move away from physical detail which is not needed, in order to produce equations, 
which then may be used in modeling or simulation. 
Ch&uy et al. The system CAMBIO uses graphical diagrams to give a functional 
description of biochemical reactions. The different types of reactions and media affected 
by the reactions are represented by graphical symbols, and the reaction structures are 
described by connections. Thus, the system lets a user design a compound reaction by 
building a graph on a computer screen. The system reads this graph and can produce 
equations semi-automatically and then perform a simulation. Some extra information 
must be given manually, e.g., about the order of the different reactions. The CAMBIO 
representation may provide an interesting connection to MFM, as described in [ 671. For 
readings on CAMBIO, see [ 12,27,88]. The system has been implemented in Pascal, but 
it is unclear how successful it has been. 
Bond graphs. From the study and systematic use of block diagrams as process 
representation comes the concept of bond graphs [ 46,98,119]. They display both energy 
and signal exchanges between components in processes. Each connection is described as 
a product of two variables, the effort and thejow. The bond graphs serve as a graphical 
representation in several disciplines, often corresponding to equations. In electronics, 
the effort corresponds to the voltage, while the flow corresponds to the current; thus, 
the product is the effect. In mechanics, the effort is the force or torque and the flow 
the velocity of rotation frequency, while in thermodynamics the effort is the absolute 
temperature and the flow the entropy [ 1191. 
The elements connected are functional components of several kinds. They may be 
simple bonds corresponding to wires, shafts, or rods, resistance elements describing for 
example resistors, inertia elements corresponding to inductors, flywheels, or masses, 
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Fig. A.2. A simple mechanical system with a mass, a spring, and friction. The mass is seen as a point mass, 






Fig. A.3. A bond graph of the system in Fig. A.2. The excitation is S,. The spring is modeled as a capacity 
element, the friction as a resistance, and the mass as an inertia element. The connection is a series junction, 
as the velocities are equal and the different forces added. From [ 1191. 
C:lik R:f 
Fig. A.4. An augmented bond graph of the system. The force of the effort source acts on the mass which 
responds with the velocity ~2, but after deducting the spring and friction forces, which are functions of the 
velocity. From [ 1191. 
capacity elements which match condensers or springs, @art sources, Jlow sources, 
transformers, etc. There are also two kinds of junctions, p and s junctions, for parallel 
and series connection. The causality between different components are shown with a 
system of arrows and bars. 
With these building blocks, it is possible to describe electrical, mechanical, thermo- 
dynamical, and other systems. A mechanical system is shown in Fig. A.2. This system 
is a simple example from mechanics, and has a point mass, a linear spring, and some 
friction. It may be described by a simple bond graph, see Fig. A.3. An augmented bond 
graph of the system is shown in Fig. A.4. Here the causality in the system is also 
described. The forces and velocities are shown in the graph. 
From bond graphs it is possible to automatically generate differential equations or 
transfer functions. Bond graphs have some superficial properties in common with MFM, 
thus they are both built from abstract functions connected into flows, and may be used to 
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generate balance equations. There, however, the similarities end. The major differences 
between bond graphs and MFM are as follows: 
l Bond graphs have no achieve or condition relations, and thus cannot represent the 
means-end dimension, which is the main point of MFM. 
l The functions are not the same. Thus, bond graphs have no barriers, while MFM 
have no capacity elements, etc. 
l The how paths of bond graphs are described by efforts and flows, and the actual 
values are usually not decided beforehand but solved for, as equations are solved. 
MFM flows are built from pure flow variables, and the flow values must be known 
beforehand; the normative nature of MFM. 
l The intended use is vastly different. Bond graphs are often used as a graphical 
representation of equations, while MFM is mainly concerned with diagnostic rea- 
soning. 
This leads to the clear conclusion that bond graphs and MFM have very little to do 
with each other. As bond graphs do not encompass the most important aspect of MFM, 
it would be misleading and potentially dangerous to use them in trying to understand it. 
One connection is possible, though. If good bond graph descriptions of a process are 
available, they represent energy balances, and these flows may be used when building 
MFM models. 
Projects using qualitative behavioral models 
The most thorough work in model-based diagnosis has arguably been done in research 
areas related to qualitative physics. This area has already been overviewed in Section 
15. Here, some further projects will be described under the appropriate headings. 
Alarm analysis 
Kramer et al. The Model Integrated Diagnosis Analysis System, MIDAS, basically 
performs alarm analysis, with extensions towards fault diagnosis. It uses qualitative 
information about process variables described in graphs. For readings on MIDAS, see 
[ 29,961. An alternative implementation in G2 of part of the MIDAS system is described 
in [ 931, from where the example below is taken. 
MIDAS is a qualitative method for finding deviations from a nominal steady state. 
The incoming measurements are turned into alarms, which are grouped into clusters that 
belong to the same primary fault. In order to do this, MIDAS uses a chain of different 
models, where each is translated into the next one more or less automatically. 
The first type of model used is the Signed Directed Graph (SDG) which is derived 
from the physical equations of the process. State variables are represented by nodes, 
and qualitative relationships by arcs. SDG also contain the total set of root causes, the 
possible primary faults. The SDG graphs are transformed to Extended SDGs to handle 
global feedback loops. The ESDGs are used to generate event graphs. In these, a set of 
events, i.e., qualitative state changes, are linked together with a root cause. 
Consider the gravity tank in Fig. AS. The level, L, of the tank is controlled by the 
inflow, qi, and the outflow, qO. In the outflow pipe, there is a flow resistance, R, that 
may vary. The balance equations of the tank are 
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Fig. AS. A small gravity tank. The level, L, of the tank is controlled by the inflow, qi, and outflow, qO, and 
there is a flow resistance, R, in the outflow pipe. 
Upstream leak Tank leak R 
Fig. A.6. A signed directed graph describing the gravity tank. The variables qi. L, qO, and R are shown, 
together with arcs that describe how a change in one of the variables will affect the others. From [93]. 
L = Clqi - c2q0 and q0 = f-(R)&. 
The SDG produced from these equations is found in Fig. A.6. The SDG model is 
translated into an Extended SDG to handle global feedback loops and then used to 
produce an event graph of the gravity tank, see Fig. A.7. 
MIDAS supervises all measured variables with a set of monitor procedures. These send 
qualitative messages to an event interpreter, which uses the event graph representation 
to construct an on-line graph of the actual events, their links, and root causes. Thus, the 
alarms are. analyzed and connected. The architecture of the MIDAS on-line system is 
shown in Fig. A.8. 
Fault diagnosis 
Several projects within AI have used model-based reasoning to perform fault diagno- 
sis. This effort has been described earlier, in Section 15. Here, some projects with closer 
connections to MFM and process control domains will be described. 
Dvorak and Kuipers. The MIMIC system is based on the QSIM modeling language 
[ 25,261. It uses QSIM models to perform a semi-quantitative simulation of a system, 
i.e., a qualitative simulation which uses quantitative information about some values and 
relationships. The system compares the simulation and the real process, and can track 
one or several models, each corresponding to a working or fault state. The system 
introduces several new ways of using alarms, basing them on the model instead of the 
process. It has been tested on small example processes and seems to be working well 
on these. 
Ng. The Inc-Diagnose project described in [92] uses a set of QSIM qualitative states 
and a new version of the diagnostic algorithm of Reiter [35,107], to perform fault 
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Fig. A.7. An event graph describing the gravity tank. There am eight events and four root causes. This is the 
data structure that MIDAS uses on-line. From [93]. 
Data from sensors 
1 
Fig. A.8. The architecture of the MIDAS on-line system. The input signals are sent to monitors, which turns 
them into qualitative vents. The event interpreter receives all events and uses them to construct an on-line 
event graph, which represents he current situation in the process. From [93]. 
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diagnosis of simple physical systems. Reiter’s theory describes a diagnosis problem 
as a system description, SD, a set of components, Comp, and a set of observations, 
Obs. In Reiter’s formulation, SD is usually a set of first-order logical formulas, but 
Ng instead uses QSIM constraints. Viewed as a formal problem, diagnosis is a NP- 
complete problem, but Ng gives an algorithm that he claims is reasonably efficient. The 
method has been tested on a temperature controller, a pressure regulator, and a toaster; 
small processes, where the execution times were a few minutes on an Explorer Lisp 
machine. 
Simulation 
Kuipers. Kuipers has developed the language QSIM for qualitative simulation [58- 
601. A system is described as a set of qualitative constraints with a given initial state, 
and QSIM can then compute the possible future behaviors of the system, by producing a 
tree of all possible, qualitative states. The expressive power of QSIM supports such rela- 
tionships a,s addition, subtraction, and derivation, while others only state a monotonical 
functional relationship. This idea can be seen as an abstraction of differential equations. 
The QSIM representation has been used to build the MIMIC diagnostic system (see 
above). 
Projects using quantitative behavioral models 
The classical models of control theory are quantitative; usually differential equations. 
Process fault detection using mathematical models and parameter estimation, extended 
with know ledge-based reasoning, so-called observer-based methods, is overviewed in 
[43]. Fault detection with classical methods is given excellent overviews in [ 32- 
341. In the Hybrid Phenomena Theory (HPT), Woods describes a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative models [ 127-1291. HPT is an attempt to combine state 
space models with a symbolic framework derived from the Qualitative Process Theory 
(QPT) [ 301. In this group there are many results and only a few examples will be 
described. 
Measurement validation 
Mah et ial. The classical form of data reconciliation uses statistical methods in order 
to find the most probable values of a set of interdependent sensors, see for exam- 
ple [82] f’or an instructive description. There are essentially two kinds of methods, 
those that handle small, random errors and those concerned with finding gross er- 
rors. 
An example of the first type of method is found in [ 821. The assumed model is 
y = x -t E, 
where y is a vector of measurements, x is a vector of true flow rates, and E is a vector of 
random errors. The system is described by an incidence matrix, A, which describes the 
process as a set of nodes and directed arrows. The nodes correspond to the rows and the 
arrows to the columns of the matrix, and a -1 marks an inflow to and a 1 an outflow 
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from a node. The errors, ei, are described by a covariance matrix, Q, which should be 
positive definite and known. The data reconciliation problem can then be formulated as 
a constrained weighted least-squares estimation problem: 
mm] (y - x)~Q-‘(Y - x) 1 
subject to the constraint 
Ax=O. 
An approximation, 2, of the true flow values, x, is given by 
2 = y - QAT( AQAT) -’ Ay. 
The use of linear programming techniques, interval arithmetic [42], and fuzzy logic has 
also been suggested. 
The most common techniques for treating gross errors are based on statistical hy- 
pothesis testing, for example chi tests. There are global tests [ 21, and nodal tests [ 831, 
which finds out whether a gross error is present, but which require some other method to 
find out where the fault is, and direct tests on each measurement [ 841, which instead re- 
quire a previous data reconciliation. These methods are usually combined with a search 
for the erroneous measurements using some kind of elimination of suspicious values 
and retesting. Common to all methods are that they need a preset significance level, a 
covariance matrix must be known, they are probabilistic and thus may fail, and they 
usually find the most probable fault hypothesis only, instead of giving all possibilities. 
Alarm analysis 
There are many methods for alarm analysis based on quantitative techniques. See 
[70] for an overview. 
Fault diagnosis 
Petti. The Diagnostic Model Processor method has been developed by Tom Petti at 
the University of Delaware [99-1011. This system uses quantitative equations to find 
a set of violated working assumptions, i.e., a set of faults, and its internal structure in 
much resembles a neural network. [ 1011 describes the DMP methodology, while [ 1001 
shows an implementation and some examples of the use of the method. 
DMP uses model equations and available measurements to arrive at the most likely 
fault conditions. It assumes that during fault free operation, all model equations agree 
with the real measurements. By analyzing in what direction and to what extent each 
model equation is violated, the most likely failed assumptions can be deduced, and each 
case of redundancy helps to make the diagnosis more certain. The process model consists 
of a set of equations written on residual form, i.e., so that they ideally equal zero. Each 
equation also has tolerance limits, representing the upper and lower limits for which the 
equation is satisfied. With the use of the tolerance limits and a sigmoidal function, the 
residual of each equation is turned into a number between - 1 and 1, telling how much 
the equation deviates from the ideal value. An example of a tank with a gravity outflow 
is given in Fig. A.9. 
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Fig. A.9. A tank with a gravity outflow. The outflow depends on the level as qOUt = am. Both the level 
and the outflow are measured, and can thus be used in a model equation. 
The outfow of the tank is given by: 
E = qaut - ~&s, 
which is written in residual form. Each equation depends on a number of assumptions, 
i.e., conditions which must be fulfilled in order for the equation to be satisfied. The 
assumptions may be explicit, such as correct sensor readings for values immediately 
visible in the equations, or implicit, e.g., that there are no leaks or blocks in the piping, 
etc. The assumptions for the tank equation are: 
0 The level sensor is working. 
0 The outflow sensor is working. 
l No leaks in the tank or pipe. 
Each equation is related to assumptions via connections, which state the sensitivity of 
the equation for a fault in this assumption. 
Finally, failure likelihoods, Fi, for each assumption may be computed, by a combi- 
nation of the satisfaction values of the connected equations. The deviation from zero 
indicates both how much and in what direction the assumption fails, i.e., whether a fault 
has been found. A DMP model of Steritherm is shown in Fig. A.lO. 
DMP has been shown to be a simple and useful diagnostic method. An advantage is 
that it is relatively easy to change the DMP data structure when a process is rebuilt. 
Due to the summing and weighting methodology, it is rather insensitive to the setting 
of tolerance levels, and there are no problems of turning quantitative measurements 
into boolean values. DMP can handle multiple faults, but it will find only one possible 
hypothesis, which may be potentially problematic. 
Projects using integration of different models 
As different model types are more or less well suited for different tasks, it would be 
advantageous to use several model types in a mixed representation. Some projects have 
focussed on the integration of different methods and model types. 
Anin et al. The “Knowledge-Based Real-Time Control Systems” project described in 
[ 3-9,631, suggests a general architecture for a knowledge-based system accommodating 
all the tasks needed in a full control and supervision system. The tasks currently handled 
are low-level loop control, sequence control, alarm and control logic, and quantitative 
simulation, as well as supervision and diagnosis based on fault trees, symptom-based 
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MODEL 
c 
Fig. A.lO. A DMP model of Steritherm. The picture contains the model equations and the assumptions, and 
some of the connections are also shown. 
diagnosis, MIDAS, MFM, and DMI? All this is contained in a multiple view data 
structure. A demonstration system has been implemented in G2. 
Krijgsman et al. The DICE system [44,55-571, is a real-time expert system for 
control systems. It is based on a blackboard architecture and represents its knowledge 
with production rules. Boolean and multivalued logic based on fuzzy logic ideas are 
available, together with a truth-maintenance system. The system is written in C and runs 
on VAXIVMS platforms. 
Crespo et al. The RIGAS system [ 15,161 is a real-time expert system based on a 
blackboard architecture. Some knowledge sources are assigned to solve control subprob- 
lems, while others, called processes, handle the activities needed, such as responding to 
external and internal stimuli. They may be either periodic or sporadic, and react to, e.g., 
requests from the operators. 
Fault diagnosis 
Viiia and Hayes-Roth. Viiia and Hayes-Roth [ 1231 use a set of different models to 
build a real-time knowledge-based system using a blackboard architecture. The prime 
models (each describing a component) are organized in five levels of information: a 
structural level, which describes the physical structure of the component; a functional 
level where the processes performed by the component are represented; a parameter 
level, where all parametrization of the component takes place; a sign level, which is a 
qualitative description of the system and its parameters; and a fault level, which defines 
all causes of faults, i.e., erroneous signs. With the prime models, domain models are 
constructed. These have three levels of information: physical connectivity, functional 
connectivity, and sensor location. The system uses these models off-line to precompute 
J.E. LarssodArtijcial Intelligence 80 (19%) 29-93 85 
a hierarchy of abstract models which are analyzed to find a worst-case timing estimate. 
This information is then used on-line, to choose the appropriate model for real-time 
simulation and diagnosis. 
Vifia and Hayes-Roth has tested this system on two control systems, RCIC, an aux- 
iliary subsystem for a power plant cooling system, [ 411, and Guardian, a system for 
patient monitoring in a surgical intensive-care unit, [ 401. The precomputed models en- 
able the system to perform simulation and model-based diagnosis in real time. The 
system has been implemented in a blackboard architecture developed for control prob- 
lems [ 38,391. This blackboard architecture is specifically designed to handle reasoning 
with hard and soft deadlines, i.e., when the result of some AI-based algorithm will be 
useless or less valuable after a certain time. The system has been used in real-time 
control applications in semi-conductor manufacturing [ 91 I. 
Struss. Struss [ 113-l 151 describes a fault diagnosis system using multiple repre- 
sentation of physical structure and function. The system is concerned with diagnosis 
of electronic circuits, and the importance of using multiple views is pointed out. An 
assumption-based truth maintenance system (ATMS) [ 50,5 11, is used to keep track of 
constraints between different levels in the structural and functional hierarchies, and it 
seems to work well in the domain of analyzing simple electronic circuits. The long term 
goal of the: work is to arrive at a general theory of diagnosis. 
Mariiio et al. Marifio et al. [ 851 describe a fault diagnosis expert system with a 
general multiple view representation. The system is object-oriented and used for clas- 
sification problems. Here, the inference engine is designed to switch between different 
views during the diagnostic search, and the contact points between the views are de- 
scribed by bridge objects. 
Appendix B. Fault diagnosis code 
Here follows a listing of C code for the fault diagnosis algorithm. This code has 
actually been copied from the MFM Toolbox in C. Some variables and statements 
concerned with bookkeeping, updating the graphics, and the measurement validation 
and alarm analysis algorithms have been omitted, though. 
/*_-RF” Fault ~~agnosis___-___________----_--__--_-______--__---_-----_-*, 
/* */ 
/+ Author: Jan Eric Larsson */ 
/* Knowledge Systems Laboratory */ 
/* Stanford University */ 
/* 701 Welch Road. Building C, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA */ 
/* Phone: +l 415 723 0948, E-mail: LarssonQKSL.Stanford.Edu */ 
/* */ 
/+__Clobal ~~fi~iti~~~---------------___________________________________*, 
struct CoalStruct { 
int No. State. Conditions; 
struct NetvorkStruct * Network; 
struct ManaSerStruct l Manager; 
struct ConditionStruct * Condition [MAXCONDSI; 
); 
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struct NetvorkStruct { 
int No, State, Functions, Coals; 
struct FunctionStruct * Function [MAXFUNCS] ; 
StruCt malstruct l cd [MAXCOALS] ; 
); 
struct ManagerStruct c 
int No, State, Fuactions; 
struct FunctionStruct l Function CMA~FUNCSI; 
struct CoalStruct * Goal; 
1; 
struct FunctionStruct c 
int No, Type, MType. State, Ins, Outs, Conditions; 
struct FunctionStruct * Is [MAXLINKS], * out [MAXLINKS] ; 
StruCt ConditionStruct l Condition CMAXCONDS~; 
struct NetworkStruct * Network; 
struct MahagerStruct * Manager; 
3; 
struct ConditionStruct ( 
int No, State; 
struct CoalStruct * Coal; 













These procedures perform the depth-first search dovnwards in the 
MFM graph, and set the state values on the way up. DiagnoseCoal 
performs the diagnostic seach for a goal object. It checks that 
the state of the goal is unknown, sets the state to undecided, (to 
avoid loops in the means-end dimension), and calls DiagnoseNetwork 
and DiagnoseManager, (if a manager exists). Finally, the state is 
updated according to the results returned. 
int DiagnoseGoal (Coal) 
struct GoalStruct * Goal; 
i 
if (Goal -> State -- UNKNOWN) c 
Goal -> State = UNDECIDED; 
Goal -> State - DiagnoseNetwork (Goal -> Network); 
if (Goal -> Manager !- NULL) { 
if (DiagnoseManager (Goal -> Manager) == FAILED) < 




return (Goal -> State); 
3 
/* 
* DiagnoseNetwork and DiagnoseManager perform the dovnward search for 
t network and manager objects. They simply go through the functions 
* in the object, calling DiagnoseFunction for each, and then return 
* working or failed. depending on the results returned. 
* 
*/ 
int DiaghoseNetvork (Network) 
struct NetworkStruct * Netvork; 
c 
int n; 
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if (Network -> State =- UNKNOWN1 i 
Network -> State = UNDECIDED; 
Network -> State = DiagnoseFunction (Network -> Function CO]); 
for (n = 1; n < Network -> Functions; n ++) { 
if (DiagnoseFunction (Network -> Function Cnl) =- FAILED) f 




return (Network -> State) ; 
1 
int DiagnoseManager (Manager) 
struct MauagerStruct * Manager; 
C 
int n; 
if (Manager -> State -- UNKNOWN) C 
Manager -> State - UNDECIDED; 
Manager -> State = DiagnoseFunction (Hanager -> Function CO]); 
for (n = 1; n < Manager -> Functions; n ++) i 
if (DiagnoseFunction (Manager -> Function Cull == FAILED) C 




return (Manager -> State) ; 
> 
* DiaguoseFuuction performs the diagnostic search for a function object. 
* First, it reads its state from the monitor array, which corresponds 
* to a sensor reading. If the value is unknown or failed the search 
* must be continued among the conditions of the function, but when it 
* is normal, further search of the current branch can be skipped. 
* 
=/ 
int DiagnoseF’mction (Function) 
struct Functi~xiStruct l Function; 
{ 
int n; 
Function -> State = Monitor CFunction -> Nol; 
if (Function -> State != WORKING kk Function -> Conditions > 0) i 
for (n = 11; II c Function -> Conditions; n ++I { 
if (DiagnoseCondition (Function -> Condition [nil == FAILED) { 




return (Function -> State); 
1 
t DiagnoseCondition performs the diagnostic search for a condition 
* object. It simply propagates the search downwards to the next goal. 
* 
=/ 
int DiagnoseCondition (Condition) 
struct ConditionStruct * Condition; 
{ 
Condition -> State = DiagnoseCoal (Condition -> Goal); 
return (Condition -> State); 
1 
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